Wynne v. Arteaga

Background

Elizabeth P. Wynne alleged that Patricia Arteaga, also known as Alma Cazares, committed identity theft by stealing, receiving, or unlawfully obtaining Wynne’s Social Security number. The opinion states that Arteaga used the number in connection with a Wells Fargo mortgage application in June 2008, and that the number’s last four digits appeared in credit reports associated with Arteaga.

Wynne asserted six claims: conversion; receiving stolen property under California Penal Code section 496; common-law invasion of privacy; violation of the California Constitution’s privacy right; violation of California’s Information Practices Act; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wynne moved for summary judgment. Arteaga asked the court to grant summary judgment in her favor without a separate motion, but discovery remained open until March 26, 2024.

Fifth Amendment inference

Arteaga invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to all but two of Wynne’s discovery requests. In a civil case, the court may draw an adverse inference—a conclusion against a party based on that party’s refusal to answer—when the questions are specific and there is independent evidence supporting the inferred fact.

The court found that the questions about how Arteaga received and used Wynne’s Social Security number were specific enough to support an adverse inference that Arteaga unlawfully obtained and used it. The court also found independent evidence in the Wells Fargo mortgage records and the Equifax and TransUnion credit reports. The court therefore made that adverse factual inference.

The court rejected a broader inference that Arteaga obtained the Social Security number in California. The discovery requests did not ask where she obtained it, and Wynne’s evidence that she was born in California and received her number there did not establish where Arteaga obtained it. The court also declined to infer that Arteaga fraudulently concealed the theft because the discovery responses did not show affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to hide it.

Conversion

A conversion claim generally requires ownership or a right to possess property, wrongful interference with that property right, and damages. The court held that Wynne’s conversion claim was time-barred on the current record. California provides a three-year limitations period for conversion, and Wynne did not dispute that she filed the claim more than three years after the 2008 use of the number.

Wynne argued that the discovery rule delayed the start of the limitations period until she discovered the alleged theft through a credit report in March 2022. The court explained that, to the extent California recognizes a discovery rule for conversion, it appeared limited to situations involving fraudulent concealment or a fiduciary-duty violation. The court found that Wynne had not shown fraudulent concealment. Because discovery was still open, however, the court denied Wynne’s motion for summary judgment on the conversion claim and declined to grant summary judgment to Arteaga.

California Penal Code section 496, constitutional privacy, and the Information Practices Act

Arteaga argued that these three claims improperly applied California law to conduct that occurred outside California. The court explained that California statutes and constitutional provisions generally do not govern conduct occurring outside the state unless the law indicates otherwise.

The court found a genuine factual dispute about where the conduct creating liability occurred. It rejected Wynne’s requested inference that Arteaga obtained the number in California and stated that the record lacked legal argument, if relevant, about where an internet-based theft occurs. The court therefore denied Wynne’s motion for summary judgment on the section 496, California constitutional privacy, and Information Practices Act claims. Because discovery was still open, the court did not reach Arteaga’s remaining arguments and declined to grant summary judgment to her without a separate motion.

Common-law invasion of privacy

Wynne framed this claim as appropriation of her name or likeness. The court explained that this type of claim, often called the right of publicity, generally concerns unauthorized use of a person’s identity for another’s advantage, including commercial use. The court distinguished that theory from the alleged theft or disclosure of personal information.

The court concluded that Wynne had not shown on the current record that identity theft and use of a Social Security number constituted the type of conduct traditionally covered by California’s common-law right of publicity. It denied summary judgment on the invasion-of-privacy claim, while noting that discovery remained open and that Wynne could theoretically develop a viable claim.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

An intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, severe emotional distress, and causation. The court held that the evidence available at that stage did not establish conduct so extreme or intolerable that it met the legal standard, even accepting Wynne’s version of the facts.

The court stated that conduct may be illegal or criminal without necessarily being extreme and outrageous for purposes of this tort. It therefore did not reach Arteaga’s other arguments about the claim. Because additional discovery was possible, the court declined to grant summary judgment to Arteaga in her favor.

Injunctive and declaratory relief

The court treated Wynne’s requests for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief as forms of requested relief rather than separate claims. Because Wynne did not prevail on any claim on the current record, those requests also failed at that stage.

Disposition

The court denied Wynne’s motion for summary judgment. It declined to grant summary judgment to Arteaga without a separate motion, and the opinion did not enter judgment ending the case.