McKinney v. United States

Background

Ayesha McKinney and Tracina Ross sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking damages based on Minnesota tort claims involving alleged conduct by Dennis Bresnahan while he was their federal probation officer. Their Third Amended Complaint asserted assault, battery, and abuse of process claims against the Government. They also asserted claims against Bresnahan under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging violations of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.

The United States moved to exclude testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. John Patrick Cronin, and moved for summary judgment on McKinney’s assault, battery, and abuse-of-process claims and Ross’s abuse-of-process claim. Bresnahan moved for summary judgment on all claims against him. The Government also addressed intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the court noted that Plaintiffs had not reasserted that claim in their Third Amended Complaint.

Expert testimony

The Government challenged Dr. Cronin’s causation opinions, arguing that they lacked an adequate factual basis and reliable methodology. Because the case would be tried to the court rather than a jury, the court applied a relaxed standard for evaluating the expert testimony. It concluded that the Government’s concerns about the reliability and credibility of the causation opinions went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. The court therefore denied the motion to exclude Dr. Cronin’s proposed causation testimony.

The Government also challenged Dr. Cronin’s proposed testimony about whether Bresnahan’s conduct was within the scope of his employment as a probation officer. The court found that Plaintiffs had not shown that Dr. Cronin, a psychologist, had sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in that field. The court therefore granted the motion to exclude that testimony.

Government’s summary-judgment motion

The court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment on McKinney’s assault claim. Under Minnesota law, assault requires an unlawful threat of bodily harm accompanied by a present ability to carry out the threat and a showing of force causing reasonable apprehension of immediate harm. The court agreed that Bresnahan’s statement, “You don’t know who you’re fucking with,” was threatening, but found that McKinney had not provided evidence of a showing of force that would support the claim.

The court granted summary judgment on McKinney’s battery claim. Minnesota battery requires intentional, unpermitted offensive contact. McKinney conceded that she had no evidence Bresnahan touched her. Her argument that Bresnahan indirectly battered her by pressuring her to remove her clothes and take nude photographs, resulting in a self-inflicted battery, did not satisfy the required contact element.

The court also granted summary judgment on both Plaintiffs’ abuse-of-process claims. McKinney had not produced evidence that Bresnahan manipulated her drug-test results, knew they were false, and used them for an ulterior purpose. The court further ruled that McKinney’s pretrial supervision and Ross’s postconviction supervised release were not “process” of the type required for an abuse-of-process claim. The court denied as moot the Government’s motion for summary judgment concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress because that claim was not included in the Third Amended Complaint.

Bresnahan’s summary-judgment motion

The court treated the official-capacity claims against Bresnahan as claims against the United States. Because a Bivens action cannot be maintained against the United States or its agencies, the court ruled that the official-capacity claims were barred.

As to the individual-capacity claims, the court concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations of sexual assault by an assigned federal probation officer presented a new Bivens context. The court explained that the Supreme Court’s previously recognized Bivens claims involved different circumstances, including a warrantless search and arrest by federal narcotics agents, a congressional employee’s employment termination, and prison officials’ failure to provide medical care.

The court then concluded that special factors counseled against creating a damages remedy in this new context. It identified the Federal Tort Claims Act as an alternative remedy, noted that Congress had not created a Bivens-type remedy for this situation, and concluded that the Eighth Amendment claims were meritless because neither Plaintiff was incarcerated when the alleged assaults occurred. The court therefore granted Bresnahan’s motion for summary judgment.

Disposition

Judge Robert W. Pratt ordered that the Government’s motion to exclude Dr. Cronin’s testimony was granted in part and denied in part: it was denied as to causation testimony and granted as to scope-of-employment testimony. The Government’s motion for summary judgment was granted as to McKinney’s assault, battery, and abuse-of-process claims and Ross’s abuse-of-process claim. Ross’s assault and battery claims remained for trial. Bresnahan’s motion for summary judgment was granted. The court also stated that the claims resolved by summary judgment against the Government were consequently barred against Bresnahan under 28 U.S.C. § 2676.