Mendez v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos and The New York City Department of Education
Eileen Mendez, individually and in her capacity as the parent and natural guardian of A.C. v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos and The New York City Department of Education
- Colleen McMahon
- 1:25-cv-05746
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
In Eileen Mendez v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos, Judge McMahon consolidated the remaining late-fee injunction issue with an earlier summary-judgment motion.
The order affects Eileen Mendez and A.C., the New York City Department of Education, and the two related cases concerning A.C.’s 2024–25 and 2025–26 school years by combining the pending late-fee motions for decision in one opinion.
What happened
Eileen Mendez v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos and The New York City Department of Education concerns Mendez’s request for court orders about A.C.’s school placement, transportation, and late fees during the 2025–26 school year.
An administrative hearing officer ruled that A.C.’s temporary placement was at iBrain and that transportation was through Sisters Travel, leaving only the late-fee issue in Mendez’s court motion. The City said it intended to follow that order, while the court said the broader placement and transportation disputes were not ready for review because the administrative process had not been completed.
Judge Colleen McMahon consolidated the remaining late-fee issue with a summary-judgment motion addressing the same legal question in an earlier related case. The court did not decide whether the City must pay the late fees in this order.
The detailed version
- Mendez v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos and The New York City Department of Education · No. 1:25-cv-05746
- Colleen McMahon
- Sept. 9, 2025
Background
This is an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act case concerning the 2025–26 school year. The opinion states that an earlier related case between Mendez and the New York City Department of Education concerns the 2024–25 school year.
On July 15, 2025, Mendez moved for a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary court order issued while a case continues. She sought declarations that:
- A.C.’s temporary educational placement for the 2025–26 school year was iBrain; - the City had to pay transportation costs under the transportation agreement with the parents and Sisters Travel and Transportation Services LLC; and - the City had to pay late fees charged by iBrain or Sisters Travel as part of A.C.’s temporary placement.
Mendez filed the court case even though she had already begun an administrative proceeding seeking the same relief. A hearing on the placement issues had been scheduled for September 3, 2025.
Administrative ruling and issues remaining
When the parties appeared for the preliminary-injunction hearing, the court learned that an impartial hearing officer had issued an order that same day. The hearing officer determined that A.C.’s temporary placement was at iBrain and rejected the City’s argument that iBrain’s substantial tuition increase had ended that placement. The hearing officer also determined that transportation for purposes of the temporary placement was through Sisters Travel, rejecting the City’s argument that it could provide adequate transportation at a lower cost.
The City acknowledged that the administrative order made all but one issue in the preliminary-injunction motion moot, meaning that those issues no longer required a court ruling in this motion. The City represented that it intended to comply with the order. The City planned to continue disputing whether iBrain remained an appropriate placement despite the tuition increase and whether the City could provide transportation itself rather than pay a private contractor. Judge McMahon stated that those issues were not ready for federal-court review because there had not yet been a due-process hearing or an appeal to a state review officer.
Late-fee dispute
The remaining issue was whether the City had to pay late fees charged by iBrain or Sisters Travel when the City did not pay tuition or transportation costs during the administrative process. Mendez argued that the late fees were included in the agreements requiring the City to make direct payments under the temporary-placement order. The City disputed that interpretation.
The opinion states that the same late-fee liability question was pending in the earlier related case. That case included a motion for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide a legal issue without a trial when the relevant facts are not genuinely disputed. The parties agreed that the late-fee question was purely legal. Judge McMahon directed the parties to finish briefing that motion so the court could address the issue in the context of permanent injunctive and declaratory relief rather than temporary relief.
Ruling
Judge Colleen McMahon consolidated what remained of the preliminary-injunction motion—the late-fee issue—with the pending summary-judgment motion in the earlier related case. The court stated that both matters would be decided in one opinion. This order did not decide whether the City is liable for the late fees, and the opinion does not state that the preliminary-injunction motion was granted or denied.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.