Mendez v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Eileen Mendez sued Melissa Aviles-Ramos, in her official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Mendez challenged the recommended educational program for A.C., a minor child with a disability, for the 2025–2026 school year. She asked an impartial hearing officer to require the Department of Education to fund A.C.’s tuition at the International Academy of the Brain, transportation, and nursing services during the dispute.

The administrative proceeding was assigned to Impartial Hearing Officer Natasha Pierre. The opinion states that Officer Pierre had not yet issued a decision. Mendez separately asked the district court for a preliminary injunction requiring immediate payment while the administrative and any later court proceedings continued.

Stay-Put Placement and Immediate Payment

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act includes a “stay-put” provision requiring a child to remain in the then-current educational placement at public expense while the dispute is pending. The court explained that this provision protects the child’s educational placement, but does not by itself require immediate payment or reimbursement.

The Department of Education conceded that iBRAIN was A.C.’s operative placement when Mendez invoked the stay-put provision. It also did not dispute that A.C. should remain there while the challenge to the 2025–2026 educational program was decided. The court therefore concluded that no injunction was needed to preserve A.C.’s attendance at iBRAIN.

The court treated Mendez’s actual request as one for advance payment of the costs of the placement and associated transportation. It relied on a prior related proceeding involving Mendez and A.C., in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the stay-put provision does not automatically require advance payment. Immediate payment could be ordered if a delay or failure to pay threatened the child’s placement, but Mendez had to satisfy the traditional preliminary-injunction standards absent such a threat.

Preliminary-Injunction Analysis

Because the stay-put provision did not automatically establish a right to immediate payment, Mendez had to show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of equities favored relief, and that an injunction was in the public interest.

Judge McMahon found that Mendez had not made the required showing. In particular, the record contained no evidence that A.C. faced imminent disenrollment from iBRAIN if the Department of Education followed its ordinary payment practices. The court also noted the Department’s assurance that it would honor its pendency obligations and pay amounts owed after the parties and the impartial hearing officer determined the scope of those obligations.

Mendez also asked the court to clarify the scope of the Department of Education’s pendency obligations. The court said that A.C.’s placement and associated transportation were already understood to be covered, and that the request was effectively another effort to obtain advance payment. To the extent Mendez sought some other clarification, the court found that issue not ready for judicial review because the parties were still litigating the appropriate educational program and the Department’s related payment obligations before the impartial hearing officer.

Disposition

The court denied Mendez’s motion for a preliminary injunction requiring payment of A.C.’s tuition at iBRAIN and associated transportation costs to Sisters Travel. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion at Docket No. 7 and remove it from the list of open motions.