Sweiha v. County of Alameda

Background

Abraam Sweiha alleged that he experienced a mental-health crisis while visiting his bedridden priest. After friends called emergency personnel, Alameda County Sheriff’s Deputies Jeffrey Edwards, Russel Armstrong, Robert Garrigan, Payam Shannon, and Erich Marapao responded. According to the complaint, a friend told the deputies that Sweiha had a mental illness, was weeping, and was not violent or threatening anyone. Sweiha alleged that he was holding a cross and praying when the deputies broke down the bedroom door and deployed a police canine. The dog allegedly bit his arm several times, including after he was handcuffed.

Sweiha alleged that the deputies took him to a hospital but that he was not treated for his mental illness or placed on a California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold. After the hospital discharged him, the deputies took him to the County jail. He alleged that jail personnel knew about his mental illness but did not treat it, and that his condition worsened. He spent a week in jail, attempted suicide, was placed in a safety cell, refused to eat, covered himself in feces and urine, was placed in a straitjacket, and was eventually transferred to a psychiatric facility.

Claims and Motion

Sweiha asserted four claims: excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; municipal liability under § 1983 based on an alleged County policy or custom under Monell v. Department of Social Services; deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983; and a Title II Americans with Disabilities Act claim. The defendants moved to dismiss the Monell and ADA claims and claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities.

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The court explained that labels, conclusions, and allegations showing only a possibility of liability are not enough. It also noted that dismissal ordinarily should be accompanied by permission to amend if additional facts could potentially cure the pleading problem.

Monell Claim

A Monell claim is a claim that a local government is liable under § 1983 because an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation. A government entity is not liable merely because it employs someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights. The plaintiff must plead, among other things, a constitutional violation, a municipal policy, deliberate indifference to the constitutional right, and a causal connection between the policy and the violation.

Sweiha alleged that the County had a longstanding practice or custom, including a failure to train, and that County policymakers ratified the deputies’ conduct. He relied on his own experience and five other incidents involving Alameda County deputies. The court held that the five incidents had markedly different facts, did not involve mistreatment of someone with a mental illness, and did not show a persistent and widespread practice amounting to a permanent and settled County policy. The court also held that the alleged incidents did not plausibly show that the County had notice of a specific training deficiency or that its failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference.

The court separately rejected the delegation and ratification theories. Sweiha’s allegation that defendants approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged, or tacitly authorized a continuing pattern of misconduct was conclusory. The court also held that an alleged failure to discipline deputies, without more, did not plead ratification. It granted the motion to dismiss the Monell claim.

ADA Claim

Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a qualified individual with a disability from its services, programs, or activities, denying that person their benefits, or discriminating against the person because of the disability. The court explained that a claim for money damages requires intentional discrimination, which in this context means deliberate indifference. The plaintiff must identify specific reasonable and necessary accommodations that the public entity failed to provide.

Sweiha alleged that the defendants knew about his bipolar disorder and mental-health crisis, escalated immediately to force, failed to provide mental-health treatment, failed to provide reasonable accommodations, and failed to transport him to a psychiatric hospital. The court held that these allegations did not plausibly show intentional discrimination or that his disability was the motivating factor for excluding him from a service or benefit. The court also noted that the jail transferred him to a psychiatric facility within a week, which, in the court’s view, supported treating the allegations as negligence rather than deliberate indifference. The court held that Sweiha had not pleaded a cognizable Title II ADA claim and granted the motion to dismiss that claim.

The opinion states that only public entities may be sued under the relevant ADA provision. Accordingly, the conclusion dismissed the ADA claims against the individual defendants with prejudice, while the partial motion to dismiss otherwise was granted without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Official-Capacity Claims and Disposition

The defendants also moved to dismiss claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Sweiha opposed that request only by pointing to his request for injunctive relief on the Monell claim. Because the court dismissed the Monell claim, it granted the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims.

The court’s final order granted the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend, except that the ADA claims against the individual defendants were dismissed with prejudice. Sweiha was permitted to file an amended complaint by October 24, 2019. The opinion did not state that the excessive-force or deliberate-indifference claims were dismissed.