Shank v. Carleton College

Background

Elizabeth M. Shank, a Carleton College graduate, alleged that she was raped by two fellow students while attending Carleton. The lawsuit concerned Carleton’s response to those incidents, not whether Carleton was legally responsible for the rapes themselves. Shank asserted claims under Title IX, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Minnesota law.

Carleton investigated the first reported assault after receiving information through community-concern reports and proceeded with a disciplinary complaint against Student One even though Shank did not initially want to file a formal complaint. The college’s Community Board on Sexual Misconduct found, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that Student One violated Carleton’s sexual-misconduct policy and imposed sanctions, including disciplinary probation, a no-contact order, resignation from an resident-assistant position, counseling, and other requirements. Carleton later reinstated and modified the no-contact order after further encounters between Shank and Student One.

After Shank reported a second assault by Student Two, she and three other students submitted a community-concern report. Carleton directed Student Two not to contact the four women, but did not pursue a formal complaint or other sanctions against him. Shank later notified Carleton that she had post-traumatic stress disorder and requested academic accommodations. Carleton granted some requests, offered alternatives to others, and said that several remaining requests would be addressed case by case with professors.

Claims and Analysis

Title IX

Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by schools receiving federal financial assistance. For the claim at issue, Shank had to show that Carleton was deliberately indifferent to known sexual harassment under its control and that the harassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to deprive her of educational opportunities or benefits.

The court held that no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. It rejected Shank’s arguments concerning the Student Health and Counseling Center’s refusal to provide transportation assistance for a forensic examination because the employees involved were confidential personnel without authority to take corrective action. The court also found that Carleton’s decision to proceed as the complaining party, its investigation, Shank’s participation in the process, and its limits on her access to information and appeal rights did not meet the high deliberate-indifference standard.

The court likewise rejected challenges to the voluntary meeting between Shank and Student One. Although Carleton suggested the meeting and facilitated it, the record did not show that Shank was required or coerced to participate. The court also found that the sanctions imposed on Student One and the no-contact directive issued to Student Two did not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Finally, although the evidence could show that posters depicting Student One adversely affected Shank and that a Carleton official knew about that effect, the court held that Carleton’s failure to remove the posters did not, in the context of its overall response, establish deliberate indifference.

Disability claims

The court analyzed Shank’s Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims together because their substantive standards were the same. Shank had to show that she had a disability, requested specific reasonable accommodations related to a known disability, and was denied meaningful access to education.

The court assumed that post-traumatic stress disorder was the disability at issue. It held, however, that Shank could not show that her requests were denied. Carleton granted her requests for a notetaker and an alternative testing space. Although Carleton did not provide course video recordings, it offered to move her classes to locations that would reduce the effects of her disability, and Shank accepted that alternative. Carleton did not categorically deny her other requests, instead explaining that they would be addressed individually with professors. Because a denial of requested accommodations was an essential element of the claims, summary judgment was entered against Shank on these claims.

Minnesota claims

Shank abandoned her theory that Carleton negligently failed to prevent the rapes and proceeded only on her claim that Carleton negligently responded to them. The court treated that theory as a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Under Minnesota law, that claim generally requires exposure to an immediate risk of physical harm. The court held that Shank did not allege that Carleton’s response placed her in such a zone of danger, so Carleton was entitled to summary judgment.

The court also rejected Shank’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It held that the evidence did not support a finding that Carleton coerced her into meeting Student One or that Carleton intentionally or recklessly exposed her to severe emotional distress. Because none of Shank’s underlying claims survived, her punitive-damages claim also failed.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted Carleton’s motion for summary judgment. The court also denied Shank’s request to supplement the record with a late-filed affidavit and ordered judgment to be entered.