Herrera v. City of Fremont
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:18-cv-02843
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 27
In Herrera v. City of Fremont, Judge Corley granted defendants’ summary-judgment motion in part, leaving excessive-force and related state-law claims for trial.
Rudi Herrera’s excessive-force claim against Officers Gerber, Gigliotti, and Francisco, and related state-law claims, remain for further proceedings. The defendants prevailed on all other claims addressed by the motion.
What happened
In Herrera v. City of Fremont, Rudi Herrera sued the City of Fremont and police officers over his arrest during a domestic-disturbance response. He alleged that officers entered his home, detained and arrested him, used a taser, and later choked him, violating federal and state law.
The court ruled that Officers Gerber and Gigliotti could enter the home without a warrant because the circumstances supported an emergency. The court also found probable cause for Herrera’s search and arrest. But disputes about whether Herrera resisted, whether he consented to a pat-down, the warnings before the taser use, and the force used by Officers Gerber, Gigliotti, and Francisco prevented judgment on the excessive-force claim.
The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The excessive-force claim against Officers Gerber, Gigliotti, and Francisco and related state-law claims remain; the motion was granted on all other claims. Judge Corley issued the order.
The detailed version
- Herrera v. City of Fremont · No. 3:18-cv-02843
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Nov. 13, 2019
Background
Rudi Herrera brought a civil-rights action against the City of Fremont, Police Chief Richard Lucero, Sergeant Little, Officers Joseph Gigliotti, Robert Gerber, and Al Francisco, after his arrest on May 14, 2017. The arrest followed a 911 call about a domestic disturbance at Herrera’s home. Herrera alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with claims under California law. The court considered defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no genuine dispute of important fact requires a trial.
The officers entered Herrera’s home without a warrant, detained and handcuffed him, and Officer Gerber used a taser twice during the handcuffing. Officer Francisco later used force while Herrera was being transferred from a squad car to a gurney for medical evaluation. Herrera testified that Francisco choked him. The criminal charges arising from the incident were eventually dismissed.
Rulings on the Federal Claims
The court granted summary judgment on Herrera’s Fourth Amendment warrantless-entry claim against Officers Gerber and Gigliotti. The court held that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement justified their entry because officers were responding to a domestic-violence call, had information that Herrera might have been seen with a gun, were told that people had been pushed or hit, were concerned about children inside, heard crying, yelling, or screaming, and did not know where the alleged victim was.
The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient for summary judgment on whether Sergeant Little’s later entry was justified by the emergency or consent exceptions. Even assuming Little violated Herrera’s constitutional rights, however, the court held that Little was protected by qualified immunity because Herrera identified no clearly established law making the particular entry unlawful. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Little on that claim.
The court granted summary judgment on Herrera’s unlawful-detention and unlawful-arrest claim. It held that the same circumstances supporting the officers’ entry also gave them probable cause to search Herrera for a weapon. It further held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to arrest him for battery on a spouse or domestic partner under California Penal Code section 243(e)(1), based on the reports that a fight occurred, Herrera had grabbed his girlfriend, the reporting minor said he had hit her and her mother, and Herrera matched the description of the responsible person.
The court denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claim against Officers Gerber and Gigliotti. The parties gave sharply different accounts of whether Herrera was compliant or resisted, whether the officers completed the pat-down, whether he fought with them, and how much warning he received before being tased. Because a jury could draw different conclusions about the force used, the court also denied summary judgment on those officers’ qualified-immunity defense.
The court likewise denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claim against Officer Francisco. The court was required at this stage to accept Herrera’s testimony that Francisco choked him while he was restrained on the gurney. The court could not determine as a matter of law that this alleged force was reasonable.
The court granted summary judgment on Herrera’s First Amendment retaliation claim because he did not show a causal connection between his alleged protected activities—slamming the front door and telling his younger brother to record the incident—and the officers’ actions. The court also granted summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim as pleaded in the first claim for relief, explaining that claims based on entry, detention, and force during an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. The court treated Herrera’s separate claim involving allegedly fabricated evidence separately.
The court granted summary judgment on the municipal-liability claim against the City and the supervisory-liability claim against Chief Lucero and Sergeant Little. Herrera did not provide sufficient evidence that a City policy, inadequate training, or ratification caused the alleged constitutional violations, or that the supervisors were personally involved or had the required causal connection.
The court granted summary judgment on Herrera’s claim that officials deliberately fabricated evidence to support criminal charges. Herrera generally relied on cellphone video but did not show that the officers fabricated the identified statements or that the alleged fabrication caused the prosecution. The court also granted summary judgment on the malicious-prosecution claim because probable cause supported the arrest and Herrera did not show that the charging recommendation was made to deprive him of a specific constitutional right.
State-Law Claims and Disposition
The court denied summary judgment to Officers Gerber, Gigliotti, and Francisco on Herrera’s claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act, because that claim was based on the same alleged excessive force and the court had allowed the excessive-force claim to proceed. The court also denied summary judgment on the related California claims for unreasonable search and seizure under the California Constitution, assault and battery, negligence, and invasion of privacy, to the extent they were based on the alleged excessive force.
The court granted summary judgment on Herrera’s false-arrest and false-imprisonment claim for the same reasons it granted summary judgment on the federal unlawful-arrest claim. In its conclusion, the court stated that defendants’ motion was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: it was denied as to the Section 1983 excessive-force claim against Officers Gerber, Gigliotti, and Francisco and the state-law claims based on that alleged constitutional violation, and granted in all other respects. The order disposed of Docket No. 51.
Read the full 27-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.