Schulz v. Bay Area Motivate, LLC

Background

John Schulz alleged that he has quadriplegia, uses a wheelchair, cannot walk or stand without mobility-assistance devices, and cannot ride a standard two-wheeled bicycle. He alleged that Bay Area Motivate, LLC; Motivate International, Inc.; Lyft, Inc.; the Metropolitan Transportation Commission; and the City and County of San Francisco operated or participated in a San Francisco bikeshare program called Ford GoBike.

Schulz alleged that the San Francisco program offered only standard two-wheeled bicycles, while the Motivate defendants offered accessible bicycle alternatives in Oakland. He alleged that he and a nondisabled friend canceled plans to use the San Francisco program in May 2018 because he could not use the available bicycles, and that he was later deterred from using the program.

Schulz asserted eight causes of action: four under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), one under the Rehabilitation Act, and three under California law. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally valid claim.

Standing

The court held that the defendants had not shown that Schulz lacked standing at the pleading stage. For an ADA access claim, a plaintiff generally must allege that he encountered a barrier to a particular facility and either intends to return or was deterred from returning. Schulz alleged that the program’s exclusive use of standard two-wheeled bicycles prevented him from using it and that he was deterred from trying again.

The defendants argued that Schulz also needed to allege that he could independently use an adaptive bicycle without staff assistance. The court rejected that argument as a standing issue, explaining that whether a lack of staff or another program feature would make a requested accommodation fundamentally alter the program concerned the merits of the claims, not standing.

Failure to State a Claim

The court dismissed the Second Cause of Action, which alleged that the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco violated ADA Title II, Part B, by failing to provide accessible bicycles in a designated public transportation program. The court interpreted “any other conveyance” in the statutory definition of designated public transportation as referring to something similar to a bus or rail vehicle, rather than a device an individual uses to transport himself or herself. It therefore concluded that the San Francisco bikeshare program was not a designated public transportation program.

The court dismissed the Eighth Cause of Action, which alleged that the Motivate defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 12184 by refusing to modify the program. That provision applies to specified public transportation services, and the court found that definition materially indistinguishable from the definition considered for the Second Cause of Action. The court therefore concluded that the San Francisco bikeshare program was not a specified public transportation service.

The court dismissed the First Cause of Action, which alleged that the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco violated ADA Title II, Part A, by operating an inaccessible program. Schulz’s theory was that accessible bicycles could be a reasonable accommodation. But he did not allege that he could use the accessible bicycles identified in the complaint, that he could operate the self-service program without assistance, or that the defendants should provide staff or storage for his mobility-assistance device. The court concluded that he had not pleaded facts showing that an accommodation would allow him to participate in the program.

The court dismissed the Seventh Cause of Action, which alleged that the Motivate defendants violated ADA Title III by denying Schulz the opportunity to use their rental service. The court held that the ADA requires nondiscriminatory access to the goods and services a public accommodation offers, but does not require a business to offer different goods or alter the mix of products it rents. The court therefore concluded that the statute did not require the Motivate defendants to add bicycle types they did not currently offer.

The court dismissed the Third Cause of Action, which alleged a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Because the court applied the same analysis to the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims, it dismissed this claim for the reasons given for the First and Second Causes of Action.

The court dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action under California Government Code § 11135. The court treated that claim as based on the same ADA Title II, Part A theory as the First Cause of Action because Schulz did not allege or argue that California law provided stronger protections relevant to the bikeshare program.

The court dismissed the Fifth Cause of Action under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants treated the claim as based on the ADA theories asserted elsewhere in the complaint, and Schulz did not dispute that interpretation. The court dismissed it for the reasons stated for the First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action.

The court dismissed the Sixth Cause of Action under California’s Disabled Persons Act. Because Schulz did not allege or argue that California law required higher standards relevant to the program, the court treated the claim as based on the ADA Title II and Title III theories asserted in the First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action and dismissed it for the same reasons.

Disposition

Judge Maxine M. Chesney granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the first amended complaint. The order did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice. It allowed Schulz to file a second amended complaint by December 23, 2019.