Grigorescu v. Board of Trustees of the San Mateo County Community College…

Background

Violeta Grigorescu filed a third amended complaint against Eugene Whitlock, the former Vice Chancellor of Human Resources at the San Mateo County Community College District. Earlier orders allowed her to pursue only two claims against Whitlock: race-based termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and retaliation for protected speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whitlock moved to dismiss both claims and separately moved to strike allegations and a request for relief from the complaint.

Grigorescu alleged that she organized and supported a group opposing conversion of an open-space garden into a parking lot, and that the resulting litigation reached the California Supreme Court. She also alleged that, after Whitlock became the District’s human-resources vice chancellor, he and others interfered with her employment, including her seniority rights, pay, participation in an on-campus organization, teaching opportunities, job application, and continued employment. She alleged that these actions were motivated by her race or Romanian background, her support for the garden litigation, or both.

Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests whether a complaint contains enough factual allegations to plausibly state a legal claim. The court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true at this stage and views them in the plaintiff’s favor.

Section 1981 race-based termination claim

For a race-based termination claim, the court explained that a plaintiff must allege that she belonged to a protected group, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and was treated less favorably than a similarly situated person outside the protected group.

The court had previously found that Grigorescu adequately alleged the first three elements but had not adequately alleged that a similarly situated, nonprotected employee was treated more favorably. The prior order specifically required facts showing that her replacement took the position close enough in time to her termination to support an inference of discrimination. The third amended complaint did not add those facts. The court also found that her renewed race-based harassment allegations were conclusory and did not reasonably suggest discrimination based on race or national origin.

The court therefore stated that any attempt to replead the previously dismissed Section 1981 harassment claim remained dismissed with prejudice. It dismissed the Section 1981 race-based termination claim without leave to amend, and the conclusion expressly states that Whitlock’s motion to dismiss that claim was GRANTED with prejudice.

Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim

A Section 1983 claim may be brought against a state actor for retaliation against the exercise of First Amendment rights. The court explained that Grigorescu had to plausibly allege protected activity, an adverse employment action, and that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the action.

The court had previously found that Grigorescu alleged participation in the garden litigation and facts suggesting that Whitlock knew about it, but had not adequately alleged a causal connection. The third amended complaint did not add allegations of Whitlock’s actions before he became the District’s human-resources vice chancellor. It did, however, allege that retaliatory actions began within weeks after he assumed that position. Those actions included attempts to bypass seniority rights, changes resulting in lower pay, preventing participation in the UMOJA community, and issuing a lower performance evaluation.

The court held that the new allegations, considered together, sufficiently pleaded a substantial and motivating retaliatory factor. It also found sufficient allegations supporting an inference that Whitlock knew of Grigorescu’s protected activity, including allegations that he had been lead counsel for the District in the garden litigation. The court therefore DENIED Whitlock’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike material that is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. Whitlock sought to strike claims and allegations concerning the District, Frontiera, and Joel; Grigorescu’s physical injuries and disabilities; Whitlock’s alleged actions before he worked for the District; and her request for relief under California Government Code § 12965(b), a provision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Because Grigorescu had not brought a claim under that California statute, the court GRANTED the motion to strike her request for relief based on California Government Code § 12965(b). The court DENIED the motion to strike the other challenged claims and allegations, finding that they could bear on the alleged retaliatory motive or on the injuries Grigorescu attributed to Whitlock’s conduct.

Disposition

Judge Edward M. Chen’s order GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART Whitlock’s motion to dismiss. It granted dismissal of the Section 1981 race-based termination claim with prejudice and denied dismissal of the Section 1983 retaliatory-harassment claim. The order also GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART Whitlock’s motion to strike: the request for relief under California Government Code § 12965(b) was stricken, while the other challenged material remained.