M. v. County of San Mateo

Background

M. M., a minor represented by a guardian ad litem, sued San Mateo County; deputies Robert Willett, Devin Crocker, and James Brown; and unnamed defendants. The complaint asserted four causes of action: constitutional-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including unreasonable search and seizure, arrest without probable cause, and excessive force; a § 1983 claim against the County under Monell; a claim under California Civil Code § 52.1, known as the Bane Act; and battery.

On August 13–14, 2017, M. M. was living at Your House South, a group home. After staff became concerned about her mental state, a journal entry, her history of self-harm, and her refusal to show her arms, staff called 911 to request an assessment for a psychiatric hold under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150. Deputy Willett reviewed information from the call and the journal entry. The specialized county mental-health assessment team was unavailable, so Willett called for an ambulance and backup deputies.

After about fifteen minutes of discussion and repeated requests that M. M. show her arms, Willett warned her that deputies would grab her wrists, move her to the floor, and handcuff her. Willett and Crocker applied rear-wrist control holds. The parties disputed whether M. M. was actively resisting and whether the deputies applied pressure before she resisted. For purposes of defendants’ motion, the court assumed in M. M.’s favor that pressure was applied before active resistance, that Willett choked her while she was placed on the floor, that a knee was placed on her back, and that she was thrown to the floor.

Motions and Legal Standard

Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the undisputed evidence requires judgment as a matter of law without a trial. M. M. cross-moved for partial summary judgment on excessive force. Defendants also moved to exclude the opinions and testimony of Roger Clark under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

The court stated that M. M. conceded summary judgment could be entered for defendants on the County’s Monell claim and on claims based on false imprisonment. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the second cause of action and on the remaining causes of action to the extent they were based on false imprisonment.

Excessive Force Analysis

The court analyzed the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim under the objective-reasonableness test. That test balances the nature and amount of force against the government’s interests, including the immediate safety threat, the seriousness of any crime, whether the person actively resisted or fled, the availability of alternatives, warnings, and the officers’ knowledge that the person was emotionally disturbed.

The court concluded that the nature and quality of the intrusion was relatively minimal. The force involved rear-wrist control holds and pressure, without weapons or other instruments. The immediate medical records documented no complaint or pain, and M. M. did not report pain to medical personnel during the psychiatric hold. The record also included photographs of bruises on her wrists and a later medical report documenting throat pain. The court treated the disputed allegations about choking, the knee, and being thrown to the floor as true for purposes of the motion but found no documented injury to her knees, breasts, or face.

The court found an important government interest in addressing the immediate concern for M. M.’s own safety and carrying out the psychiatric hold. It found the matter was not a serious crime case, and it recognized that M. M.’s emotional disturbance weighed against using a higher level of force. The court also found that M. M.’s refusal to comply constituted at least passive resistance, which could support some force, and that the officers had warned her before applying the wrist hold. The specialized mental-health team was unavailable, and the court found no alternative method available under the circumstances.

Balancing these factors, the court held that the government’s interests outweighed the intrusion and that the deputies used a minimal amount of force. It concluded that the force was objectively reasonable and not excessive. The court therefore granted summary judgment for defendants on the first cause of action and denied M. M.’s motion for partial summary judgment on excessive force. The court denied as moot defendants’ request for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

State-Law Claims

The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the Bane Act claim because that claim required a violation of a constitutional or civil right, and the court had found no Fourth Amendment violation.

The court analyzed the battery claim under the same objective-reasonableness standard used for the excessive-force claim. Because it had concluded that the deputies’ actions were objectively reasonable and did not involve excessive force, it granted summary judgment for defendants on the battery claim.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied M. M.’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denied as moot defendants’ motion to exclude Roger Clark’s expert opinions and testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The order terminated docket numbers 51, 53, and 59.