McReynolds v. State of Minnesota

Background

Barry Ishmael McReynolds brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for constitutional violations by government officials. He alleged that Zachary Hansen, a Minnesota State Patrol trooper, violated his rights during a December 12, 2019 traffic stop. The claims at issue were: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging that Hansen stopped McReynolds because of his race; (2) a Fourth Amendment claim alleging that Hansen unlawfully searched him; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on Hansen’s response to McReynolds’s refusal to answer questions; (4) a Minnesota-law battery claim based on the search; and (5) a Fifth Amendment retaliation claim.

The State of Minnesota was originally named as a defendant, along with claims against the individual troopers in their official capacities. The court previously dismissed the State as a party and dismissed the official-capacity claims. McReynolds later stated that he did not intend to pursue the Fifth Amendment retaliation claim.

During the stop, Hansen observed that McReynolds’s rear license plate was nearly covered by snow. Hansen also observed McReynolds drift slightly within his lane. After stopping McReynolds, Hansen asked about alcohol and weapons. McReynolds repeatedly said that he did not drink and later said that he did not answer questions and did not carry weapons. Hansen ordered McReynolds out of the car, conducted a pat-down search, including repeated contact with the front of McReynolds’s beltline and groin area, and administered field sobriety tests. A portable breath test showed a blood alcohol content of zero.

Hansen later gave different explanations for the pat-down. During an internal investigation, he said McReynolds’s refusal to answer whether he had a weapon was “elusive” and prompted the search. In a later deposition, Hansen said he had observed a bulge near McReynolds’s groin area and that the bulge, the time of night, and the location of the stop contributed to his suspicion. McReynolds disputed that a bulge existed. The court noted that the video did not show a bulge, Hansen did not mention one during the earlier investigation, and no weapon or other item was recovered from the area.

Legal standards

Hansen sought summary judgment, a ruling without a trial that is proper when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over facts that could affect the outcome. He also invoked qualified immunity, which can protect government officials from damages for constitutional violations unless the evidence shows a constitutional violation and the violated right was clearly established at the time.

At the summary-judgment stage, the court could not decide which side’s disputed testimony was more credible. It had to view supported facts in the light most favorable to McReynolds, unless the record so clearly contradicted those facts that no reasonable jury could accept them.

Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claim

McReynolds alleged that Hansen selectively enforced traffic laws against him because of his race. The court held that McReynolds had not presented evidence that Hansen failed to stop similarly situated people of another race. Although McReynolds pointed to other vehicles that drifted within their lanes, he did not show that those vehicles also had similarly obstructed license plates. The court noted that the snow-covered plate provided probable cause for the stop under Minnesota law and that McReynolds had not shown racial motivation. The court therefore concluded that Hansen was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

First and Fifth Amendment retaliation claims

McReynolds claimed that Hansen ordered or conducted the pat-down in retaliation for McReynolds’s refusal to answer questions. The court held that McReynolds had not identified controlling precedent or a strong consensus of cases establishing a First Amendment right to refuse to answer an officer’s questions during a traffic stop. Because the right was not clearly established, Hansen was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

The court also granted summary judgment on the Fifth Amendment retaliation claim because McReynolds stated that he did not intend to pursue it.

Fourth Amendment search claim

The Fourth Amendment generally requires an officer conducting a protective pat-down during a traffic stop to have reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. The court concluded that the lawfulness of Hansen’s pat-down depended on whether Hansen actually observed the claimed bulge.

If Hansen observed a bulge, the court said, the search would have been supported by reasonable suspicion. But if no bulge existed, the remaining facts—McReynolds’s initial refusal to answer the weapons question, his later denial that he carried weapons, the time of night, and the location of the stop—were not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the bulge existed and held that a jury, not the court on summary judgment, must resolve the credibility question. The court therefore denied Hansen’s request for qualified immunity and denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment search claim.

The court also rejected Hansen’s argument that the search of McReynolds’s groin area was separately protected by qualified immunity. The court explained that such a search would still require reasonable suspicion that McReynolds was armed and dangerous, and that issue depended on the disputed evidence about the bulge.

Minnesota battery claim

Under Minnesota law, battery is intentional, unpermitted offensive contact. For police conduct, the contact must involve excessive force, and the officer’s contact must first be legally justified. Because the court could not determine on summary judgment whether Hansen’s pat-down was legally justified, it also could not conclude that the battery claim failed as a matter of law. The court therefore denied summary judgment on the battery claim.

Disposition

The order states that Hansen’s motion for summary judgment was “GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.” It was denied as to Counts 2 and 4, McReynolds’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search claim and Minnesota battery claim. It was granted as to Counts 1, 3, and 5, the Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claim and the First and Fifth Amendment retaliation claims. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice.