Perseke v. Moser

Background

Michael Perseke is civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) in Moose Lake, Minnesota. He sued MSOP employees and state officials overseeing MSOP, alleging violations of his procedural due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his protection against unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.

The claims arose from three sets of property seizures. In November 2018, MSOP took items Perseke was not allowed to possess, items with missing or incorrect identification bar codes, and other items it considered suspected contraband. MSOP later returned many items. After a hearing, it imposed a one-year restriction on Perseke’s ability to order or possess a lamp, fan, battery charger, or clock. Perseke appealed the hearing decision, but the appeal was denied on December 5, 2018. MSOP did not dispose of the property until February 4, 2019.

In December 2018, MSOP confiscated notepads, post-it notes, and a cup containing an unknown substance. Perseke did not object to or appeal that seizure, and MSOP disposed of the items under its policy. In April 2019, MSOP found a clock in his room in violation of the durable-goods restriction and imposed a three-year restriction. Although Perseke said he appealed, the record contained no evidence supporting that claim, and MSOP disposed of the clock under its policy.

The court had previously dismissed the substantive-due-process part of Perseke’s claims. The remaining claims alleged that the seizures violated procedural due process and the Fourth Amendment, and that requiring Perseke to dispose of the property also violated procedural due process. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that no material facts were genuinely disputed, Perseke had not shown constitutional violations, and two defendants lacked personal involvement.

Court’s Analysis

Fourth Amendment. The court applied a balancing test that weighs the intrusion on Perseke’s interests against the need for institutional security. It accepted MSOP’s stated reasons for its property policies, including using bar codes to identify property, prevent residents from selling or trading property, and promote institutional security and therapeutic goals. Because Perseke offered no evidence that these justifications were false, the court deferred to MSOP’s judgment. It concluded that Perseke had not shown that the seizures were unreasonable, so Count 2 failed.

Procedural due process. The court first stated that Perseke had no constitutionally protected interest in possessing property that MSOP policy prohibited him from possessing. It also stated that removing the property from his room did not necessarily deprive him of it because he could arrange for the property to be sent outside the facility while maintaining ownership.

The court further ruled that, even assuming Perseke had a protected property interest and had been deprived of it, MSOP was not required to provide a hearing before the seizure. MSOP held confiscated property, gave residents an opportunity to challenge the seizure, and did not immediately destroy the items. The court found that this procedure satisfied due process.

The court rejected Perseke’s argument that MSOP’s 30-day disposal policy violated due process because administrative appeals could take longer. In Perseke’s case, MSOP waited until after his appeal of the November seizure was resolved before disposing of the property. He did not appeal the December or April seizures, and the record contained no evidence that MSOP disposed of another resident’s property while an appeal was pending. The court concluded that Perseke received notice of the seizures and their reasons, as well as a meaningful opportunity to challenge them. The fact that his November appeal was unsuccessful did not establish a due-process violation.

Individual liability and qualified immunity. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a state actor’s direct involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The court found no allegation or evidence that Peter Puffer or Sue Johnson personally participated in the alleged violations. Perseke did not respond to the defendants’ argument on this point, and the court stated that Puffer and Johnson would have to be dismissed even if the constitutional claims otherwise survived.

The court also stated that qualified immunity would protect the defendants unless Perseke could show both a constitutional violation and that the asserted right was clearly established at the time. Because the court concluded that Perseke had not shown a constitutional violation, it did not decide whether the rights were clearly established.

Disposition

The court held that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Perseke’s claims. Judge Paul A. Magnuson granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.