Peirow-Salehi v. Berryhill

Background

Javad Peirow-Salehi appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. He alleged that his disability began January 1, 2011. After a hearing, an administrative law judge found that Peirow-Salehi had severe impairments involving back pain, anxiety or social anxiety disorder, and depression. The judge determined that Peirow-Salehi could perform medium work with restrictions to frequent climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolding; stooping; crawling; and simple repetitive tasks in a non-public setting. The judge concluded that Peirow-Salehi was not disabled because he could perform jobs existing in the national economy.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide the case based on the administrative record and governing law. The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge properly evaluated the medical evidence, Peirow-Salehi’s testimony, his father’s statements, and the finding at the fifth step of the disability analysis that he could perform other work.

Medical evidence

The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific and legitimate reasons for assigning no significant reliance to the opinion of examining physician Dr. Timothy Ong. The judge found that Ong’s restrictions were not adequately supported by the medical evidence and were inconsistent with examination findings showing normal and full motor strength, grip strength, gait, reflexes, and sensation. The court rejected Peirow-Salehi’s argument that the judge improperly substituted a personal medical opinion for Ong’s opinion. The court also found no indication that Peirow-Salehi’s condition was progressively deteriorating, which could otherwise have made the more recent examination especially important.

The court found a different error in the treatment of examining physician Dr. Robert Bilbrey’s opinion. The administrative law judge gave Bilbrey’s opinion “some reliance,” but less reliance than the opinions of the state-agency evaluators, because Bilbrey had seen less medical evidence. The court held that this explanation did not sufficiently identify how the evidence Bilbrey reviewed was deficient compared with the evidence reviewed by the state-agency evaluators. Because Bilbrey’s report stated that he had reviewed a multiple-page information form and previous records, the court concluded that the administrative law judge needed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Bilbrey’s opinion.

The court also found that the administrative law judge implicitly rejected the state-agency doctors’ restriction to simple one- or two-step work by using the broader phrase “simple repetitive tasks” without explaining the omission. The Commissioner conceded that this was an error, but the court held that the error was harmless because the vocational expert identified one job—night cleaner—that Peirow-Salehi could still perform under the one- or two-step restriction, with approximately 100,000 such jobs nationally according to the testimony quoted in the opinion.

Peirow-Salehi’s testimony and his father’s report

The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s evaluation of Peirow-Salehi’s testimony was tied to the erroneous evaluation of Bilbrey’s opinion. The administrative law judge therefore had to reassess Peirow-Salehi’s testimony after properly evaluating the medical evidence.

By contrast, the court upheld the treatment of the report from Peirow-Salehi’s father. The court found that the administrative law judge gave reasons specific to the father’s report, including that the reported limitations were not supported by the medical evidence. The court held that these were adequate reasons to give the report no significant reliance.

Step-five finding

The court held that the administrative law judge must reconsider whether the hypothetical given to the vocational expert accurately reflects Peirow-Salehi’s limitations after reassessing Bilbrey’s opinion and Peirow-Salehi’s testimony. A vocational hypothetical must include the claimant’s limitations when those limitations are supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition

The court concluded that it was not clear whether Peirow-Salehi would have to be found disabled if Bilbrey’s opinion, Peirow-Salehi’s testimony, and the step-five finding were properly evaluated. The court therefore granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not order an immediate award of benefits.