Bauer v. City of Pleasanton

Background

John and Rose Bauer alleged that their son, Jacob Bauer, died after Pleasanton police responded to a grocery-store disturbance. According to the amended complaint, officers restrained Jacob, placed a spit mask over his mouth, used a stun gun and taser several times, struck him with a baton, and stomped on his chest. The complaint alleged that Jacob became unresponsive and turned blue, but officers did not provide medical care and prevented medical personnel at the scene from doing so.

The parents alleged that they had previously contacted Pleasanton police at least four times about Jacob’s mental-health condition and sought help getting him committed for evaluation and treatment. Their amended complaint asserted federal and state claims involving excessive force, failure to provide medical care, familial association, wrongful death, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the California Bane Act, negligent hiring and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss the municipal-liability claim, the negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training claim, and the emotional-distress claim. They also sought dismissal of the claims against Chief Dave Spiller on the ground that those claims duplicated claims against the City. The defendants separately challenged survival claims because the plaintiffs had not filed a required affidavit, but the plaintiffs filed the affidavit, making that part of the motion moot.

Municipal-liability claim

The plaintiffs alleged that the City had a longstanding practice of failing to use de-escalation tactics and of using excessive force against mentally ill people. They relied on Jacob’s death and two earlier fatal shootings involving people experiencing mental-health crises. They also alleged that the City failed to investigate or correct those incidents, failed to provide adequate training, and ratified the officers’ conduct.

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a local government can be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. The court held that the allegations were too conclusory to plausibly establish such liability. The two earlier incidents were not described in enough detail to show that they were factually similar or that they demonstrated a persistent and widespread practice rather than isolated events. The court also held that the ratification allegations did not identify a final policymaker or plausibly explain how one approved the conduct. The court dismissed the municipal-liability claim with leave to amend.

Claims against Chief Spiller

The court dismissed the claims against Chief Spiller with leave to amend. It held that the complaint did not allege his personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between his own conduct in training or supervising officers and the alleged violation.

Negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training

The defendants argued that California law did not allow the asserted direct-liability claim against a public entity and did not support vicarious liability on the allegations presented. The court granted the motion to dismiss this claim. It explained that California public entities generally need a statutory basis for liability and that the plaintiffs had not identified one for direct negligent hiring or supervision.

The plaintiffs argued that the City could be vicariously liable under California Government Code section 815.2 and that the parties had a special relationship because the parents had contacted police several times about Jacob. The court held that the complaint did not plausibly allege such a special relationship. It gave the plaintiffs leave to amend, while expressing doubt that the deficiency could be cured.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The plaintiffs asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress as a survival claim. The court held that they did not allege conduct directed at the parents and that emotional-distress damages do not survive the death of the person who experienced the distress. It dismissed the survival claim with prejudice. It dismissed without prejudice any claim the parents might assert on their own behalf.

Disposition

The court granted the motion to dismiss with leave to amend, except that it dismissed the survival emotional-distress claim with prejudice. The order therefore granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The opinion does not state a separate disposition for the other claims in the amended complaint.