Diaz v. Tesla, Inc.

Background

Owen Diaz’s claim against Tesla under Section 1981, a federal law concerning racial discrimination in contracting and employment relationships, was scheduled to proceed to trial. Diaz stated that he would proceed only on theories of racial harassment and failure to prevent harassment. The parties filed motions in limine, which are requests for rulings about trial evidence before the jury hears it.

Diaz’s motions

The court denied Diaz’s request to prevent Tesla from calling Ramon Martinez, an alleged harasser, because Diaz had not deposed him. The court also denied Diaz’s request for a late deposition, finding that Diaz had not diligently pursued Martinez’s deposition. The court did not make a final pretrial ruling on Martinez’s written statement from an investigation; it indicated that the statement appeared likely to be admissible either as non-hearsay or under an exception to the hearsay rule, with final document-admissibility decisions to be made at trial.

The court ruled that evidence about Diaz’s work performance, including his relationship with Rothaj Foster, was admissible to the extent it explained Tesla’s decisions or provided context for other conduct. The court stated that the jury must consider the total circumstances in deciding whether the work environment was hostile, but it would ensure that the evidence was used for a proper purpose and framed appropriately.

The court also allowed Tamotsu Kawasaki, Wayne Jackson, and Michael Wheeler to testify about hearing the n-word at the Tesla factory and their perceptions of how it was used. The court rejected Diaz’s relevance, speculation, and unfair-prejudice objections, while noting that Diaz could challenge the witnesses’ perceptions and the context of their testimony through cross-examination.

The court allowed Tesla to explore how Demetric Diaz’s arrest and felony convictions contributed to Owen Diaz’s emotional distress, including the possible role of financial issues. If Demetric testified, evidence of his convictions could be used for impeachment. The court barred references to the specific crimes and limited the evidence to the fact of the convictions and, if Owen Diaz helped pay it, the amount of the bond.

Tesla’s motions concerning other witnesses and evidence

The court granted Diaz’s position in part concerning testimony from people who experienced racial harassment other than Diaz. It allowed some testimony about unrelated incidents when the testimony could show that Tesla knew or should have known about racial harassment and therefore had a duty to address it. The court deferred decisions about documents concerning those incidents until trial.

Demetric Diaz could testify about events and complaints of harassment of which Owen Diaz was aware. Lamar Patterson’s testimony was not limited because his work overlapped with Diaz’s in all relevant respects, and his alleged complaints could help show that Tesla had notice of the work environment. Michael Wheeler could testify about harassment he reported, to show Tesla’s notice, or harassment of which Diaz was aware, to explain Diaz’s failure-to-prevent theory.

Wayne Jackson’s testimony about generally hearing the n-word was not finally excluded. It could become admissible if Tesla raised the defense that it had reasonably tried to prevent and correct harassment and that Diaz unreasonably failed to use those measures. The court also stated that if Tesla elicited Jackson’s view that the word was used non-offensively, Diaz could ask about the occasions when Jackson heard it.

Melvin Berry was not permitted to testify because Diaz had not provided good cause for failing to disclose Berry as a witness. Nigel Jones’s testimony was not relevant to Diaz’s case-in-chief because Jones did not overlap with Diaz’s work, work areas, or supervisors, although it could become relevant in rebuttal if Tesla raised that defense. The court likewise ruled that DeWitt Lambert’s testimony was inadmissible in Diaz’s case-in-chief because he had different departments, supervisors, and alleged harassers, but left open possible rebuttal use.

Nathan Fraim, Titus McCaleb, and Jackel Williams were not relevant to Diaz’s case-in-chief based on the parties’ descriptions of when and where they worked, but the court would assess possible rebuttal use at trial if Tesla raised the same defense. The court noted that some other witnesses might also be permitted as rebuttal witnesses if their testimony was relevant and not duplicative.

The court granted Tesla’s motion concerning Randall Kennedy’s book titled “N-word.” Diaz could not use the book as a trial prop because the court found that it had no probative value, although Diaz could use other ways to communicate the word’s significance to the jury.

Sealing request and disposition

Diaz had filed exhibits under seal based on confidentiality designations by Tesla and former defendants. Because no defendant submitted the required supporting declaration, the court denied the sealing request at Docket No. 188 and ordered the Clerk to unseal the docket entry in its entirety.

Judge William H. Orrick’s order primarily governed the evidence and testimony available at the upcoming trial. It did not decide the merits of Diaz’s Section 1981 claim.