Jacobson v. County of Chisago

Background

Michelle Jacobson worked in the Chisago County Sheriff’s Office from July 2013 until approximately May 2018. The opinion states that Richard Duncan, then the Chisago County Sheriff and Jacobson’s highest-ranking supervisor, used a pseudonym beginning in October 2017 to send her sexually harassing letters, emails, and text messages. The messages included threats of harm to Jacobson’s children if she did not comply with Duncan’s sexual demands. Duncan later resigned, and he pleaded guilty to stalking with intent to injure in Chisago County District Court.

Jacobson asserted claims against the County under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and claims against Duncan under a federal civil-rights statute and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also asserted an intentional-infliction claim against the County. In a July 2021 summary-judgment ruling, the court found the County vicariously liable under the Minnesota Human Rights Act for Duncan’s harassment, found Duncan liable on Jacobson’s civil-rights claim, and found no genuine factual dispute about Duncan’s liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also found the County immune from vicarious liability on the intentional-infliction claim.

The case went to a jury only on damages. The jury awarded Jacobson $0 for past economic harm, $565,000 for past and future mental anguish, and $550,000 in punitive damages against Duncan.

The County’s Post-Trial Motions

The County filed two motions. First, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, which allows a court to alter a judgment or order a new trial in limited circumstances, it asked the court to change its earlier finding of vicarious liability under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Alternatively, it requested a new trial based on the testimony of Jacobson’s treating therapist, Linda Richnofsky, and psychologist, Stephanie Forness.

The County argued that the treating providers should have been disclosed as non-retained expert witnesses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C). The court had allowed them to testify as fact witnesses, limited to their observations, treatment, and diagnosis of Jacobson. The County contended that portions of their testimony went beyond that permitted scope and prejudiced the damages verdict.

The court rejected the Rule 59 arguments. It held that the County had identified no legal or factual error and had presented no newly discovered evidence supporting a change to the judgment. Regarding the treating providers, the court found that their testimony stayed within the scope of Jacobson’s counseling records and concerned their observations, clinical impressions, treatment, diagnosis, and the duration and frequency of treatment. The court concluded that they did not give undisclosed expert opinions about causation or other matters outside their treatment of Jacobson. It also found that the County had not shown that the testimony probably changed the trial result. The court noted that other evidence supported the damages award, including testimony from Jacobson, her husband, and her daughter, as well as the counseling records.

Motion to Allocate Damages

The County separately asked the court to assign one-third of the $565,000 emotional-distress award to the County and two-thirds to Duncan, based on the number of claims for which each defendant was liable. Duncan took no position on the County’s motion in his written submission but argued at the hearing that the County should be solely responsible or, alternatively, that the award should be divided evenly. Jacobson argued that the damages could not be apportioned and that the County had waived the issue by not raising it earlier.

The court denied the County’s allocation motion. It reasoned that the County’s liability was vicarious—that is, legally based on Duncan’s conduct—rather than based on separate conduct by the County that could be assigned a separate portion of the harm. Because the harm was indivisible, the court held that the County was responsible for the same emotional-distress damages as Duncan. The court also held that, even if apportionment had been possible, the County failed to raise and prove the issue in a timely manner.

Disposition

The court ordered that the County’s Motion to Allocate Emotional Distress Damages Among Defendants was DENIED and that the County’s Motion to Amend Judgment and for a New Trial was DENIED. The opinion states that two motions filed by Jacobson—for a civil penalty and for attorneys’ fees and costs—remained pending, with a ruling deferred because limited discovery had been reopened in light of newly discovered evidence.