Abdullah v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Rashad Abdullah and his daughter, T.A., sued the City and County of San Francisco and San Francisco probation officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. The claims arose from T.A.’s 11-day detention after police arrested her for allegedly stealing a cell phone. The police report stated that the victim identified another minor, not T.A., as the person who took the phone.

A probation officer submitted a probable-cause request to a state court. Judge Daniel Flores found no probable cause and ordered T.A.’s release. The opinion says that, later that evening, a supervisor submitted a second, essentially identical request through the after-hours court system without mentioning the first request. Judge Monica Wiley then issued an order finding probable cause to detain T.A. At a later detention hearing, the probation officer did not mention either request or order. T.A. remained detained until Judge Flores ordered her released on February 26, 2019. The petition against her was later dismissed.

The amended complaint alleged that the Probation Department had policies or customs involving five subjects: disregarding probable-cause requirements for detained youth; failing to train or discipline officers; failing to notify minors, parents, and attorneys about probable-cause requests and determinations; seeking probable-cause decisions from after-hours judges; and keeping youth detained until detention hearings despite circumstances supporting release.

Issue and Governing Standard

The City and County moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The motion concerned the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability claims, known as Monell claims, embedded in three § 1983 counts. Under Monell, a local government is not liable merely because it employs someone who allegedly violated a person’s rights. The plaintiff must connect the constitutional injury to a government policy or custom, including a sufficiently established practice or a deliberately indifferent failure to train.

Court’s Analysis

The court focused on whether a direct causal link connected a claimed municipal policy to T.A.’s detention. It held that the allegations did not show that the harm resulted from most of the proposed policies.

First, the officer sought a probable-cause determination within 48 hours, so the allegations did not show that he disregarded the probable-cause timing process or violated the alleged 72-hour policy. Second, the plaintiffs cited no authority showing that an ex parte request—one made without the other side’s participation—was itself unconstitutional. The court viewed the alleged problem as the failure to disclose the requests and orders, not the ex parte procedure.

Third, the allegations did not plausibly show unconstitutional forum shopping. The first request was made during court hours, and the after-hours procedure was used only after the first order was not obtained from the clerk’s office during business hours. The court also found no factual basis for the categorical claim that after-hours judges were more likely to find probable cause.

Fourth, the court said that although detaining youth when intervening circumstances support release might be bad policy, the law permits detention until a detention hearing when there is a judicial probable-cause determination and detention order. Again, the alleged problem was the failure to disclose the requests and orders.

Fifth, the failure-to-train theory did not survive insofar as it concerned the alleged failure to train officers about the 48-hour rule or to discipline violations of those rules, because the officer here followed the 48-hour rule. But the failure-to-train theory survived to the extent it concerned training about the policy of not disclosing probable-cause requests and determinations.

Finally, the court considered allegations of three earlier occasions when probation officers allegedly failed to comply with release orders. The court said those incidents could support a municipal-liability claim if the alleged lack of notice was a policy, because the lack of notice could plausibly have caused T.A.’s detention from February 15 through February 26. If the lack of notice was not a policy, however, the incidents would be isolated mistakes insufficient to establish municipal liability.

Disposition

Judge Laurel Beeler granted in part and denied in part the City and County of San Francisco’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Monell claims on all theories except the theory that the Probation Department failed to provide notice of probable-cause requests and determinations. The claims survived at the pleading stage insofar as they were based on allegedly withholding those requests and determinations from minors, parents, attorneys, and apparently the court, as well as on improper training concerning that policy. The order disposed of ECF No. 43.