Matos v. Saul

Background

Hilda Matos’s counsel, Katherine Siegfried, sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a federal law that can require the government to pay litigation costs when a person wins against unjustified government action. Matos had challenged the denial of her claim for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

In an earlier order, the court granted Matos’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the administrative law judge did not commit reversible error regarding Matos’s mental impairments but did err by failing to properly evaluate whether her fibromyalgia was a medically determinable impairment under the agency’s guidelines and by failing to analyze its effects at later stages of the disability evaluation. The court did not decide Matos’s remaining arguments but instructed the agency to consider them on remand.

Fee request and the government’s objections

Matos requested $10,057.25 for 49 hours of work at $205.25 per hour, $923.63 for 4.5 hours spent preparing a reply brief, and reimbursement of the $400 filing fee. The government argued that its position was substantially justified because the court rejected the challenge concerning mental impairments and did not decide some of Matos’s other arguments. It also argued that 49 hours was excessive because routine Social Security cases are generally litigated in 15 to 30 hours, and asked the court to reduce the award.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that Matos was a prevailing party because she received a remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the government must show that both its underlying agency action and its litigation position had a reasonable basis in law and fact to avoid paying fees.

The court found that the government was not substantially justified. The administrative law judge had discussed fibromyalgia during the hearing, but the decision did not apply the correct legal standard for analyzing fibromyalgia. The court therefore rejected the government’s argument that the hearing discussion justified its defense of the agency’s decision.

The court also found the requested fees reasonable. It approved the $205.25 hourly rate, which was the cost-of-living-adjusted statutory maximum for the relevant years in the Ninth Circuit. It declined to reduce the hours merely because Matos obtained remand based on fewer than all of her arguments, reasoning that the arguments involved a common set of facts and related legal theories. The court also found that counsel’s 49 hours were reasonable under the circumstances, including counsel’s lack of involvement in the administrative hearing and the need to become familiar with the record while preparing the case for court.

The court found the $923.63 request for preparing the reply brief reasonable and held that Matos was entitled to reimbursement of the $400 filing fee. The opinion states that the fee award should be paid directly to Siegfried, subject to any debt offset.

Disposition

Judge Hixson granted Matos’s motion and awarded $10,980.88 in attorney’s fees and $400 in costs.