Lynch v. Davis

Background

Franklin Lynch filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his custody. He sought permission to file a motion for partial summary judgment on Claim 9, which alleged that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to represent himself at trial. He also asked the court to stay and hold in abeyance his other claims—meaning pause them for later consideration—including claims that were exhausted and claims that were not exhausted in state court.

Lynch based the request on the COVID-19 pandemic and his asserted elevated health risks from age and medical conditions, including obesity, asthma, hypertension, and prediabetes. He later notified the court that he had contracted COVID-19 and continued to pursue the motion based on his claimed risk of reinfection.

The parties’ positions

Lynch argued that quickly litigating Claim 9 while preserving the remaining claims would help address the threat to his health. The respondent argued that the court could not partially adjudicate a mixed habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The respondent also argued that deciding Claim 9 would take many months and would not provide Lynch with prompt release, even if he prevailed.

Court’s reasoning

The court explained that the Supreme Court’s “total exhaustion” rule generally requires a federal court to dismiss a mixed habeas petition rather than decide only its exhausted claims. The Supreme Court has also recognized authority to stay a mixed petition so that a petitioner can return to state court to exhaust claims. But Lynch’s motion sought more: he wanted the court to decide an apparently exhausted claim while using a stay to preserve the remaining claims.

The court found that Lynch had provided no authority clearly allowing it to disregard the total-exhaustion rule and partially adjudicate a mixed petition. The court discussed an earlier appellate decision involving extraordinary circumstances but concluded that the decision did not authorize the relief Lynch requested here.

The court separately concluded that the requested relief would not meaningfully alleviate Lynch’s health concerns. Because Lynch had already contracted COVID-19, the court reasoned that his infection would likely run its course before Claim 9 could be finally decided in the district court and any request for release during an appeal could be considered. The court also found that the material Lynch cited did not establish a scientific consensus about reinfection.

Ruling and effect

Judge M. Chen denied Lynch’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Scheduling Order, Docket No. 48. The order disposed of that motion. It did not decide the merits of Claim 9 or the remaining habeas claims. The court also noted that claims concerning prison officials’ alleged failure to protect Lynch from infection or provide adequate medical care would belong in civil-rights litigation rather than this habeas case.