DiGiacomo v. Comcast Corporation
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:20-cv-04492
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In DiGiacomo v. Comcast, Judge Beeler found the self-represented plaintiff’s federal claims insufficient, declined the state claims, and allowed amendment before possible dismissal.
Raymond Vincent DiGiacomo, Jr., Comcast Corporation, and the City and County of San Francisco. The order found the federal claims inadequately pleaded, did not reach the state-law claims, and allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.
What happened
In DiGiacomo v. Comcast Corporation, Raymond Vincent DiGiacomo, Jr., representing himself, sued Comcast Corporation and the City and County of San Francisco over loud noises from internet-cabling box covers near his home. He asserted federal constitutional claims and related state-law claims.
The court screened the complaint because the plaintiff was allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee. It found that the complaint did not plausibly state a federal claim, including due-process, equal-protection, and municipal-policy claims. Because no federal claim was adequately pleaded, the court did not reach the state-law claims. The plaintiff could file an amended complaint by August 20, 2020; otherwise, the court would reassign the case and recommend dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction.
Judge Laurel Beeler issued the screening order on July 24, 2020. The order also said the plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss the case by filing a one-page notice, which would result in dismissal without prejudice for the state claims.
The detailed version
- DiGiacomo v. Comcast Corporation · No. 3:20-cv-04492
- Laurel Beeler
- July 24, 2020
Background
Raymond Vincent DiGiacomo, Jr., representing himself and proceeding without paying the filing fee, sued Comcast Corporation and the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF). He alleged that internet-cabling boxes installed under roads pursuant to a contract with CCSF had loose or improperly fastened covers. When vehicles drove over them, the covers allegedly produced extremely loud noises that sounded like gunshots, including near his bedroom windows. He alleged that the noise interfered with his sleep and enjoyment of his property.
The complaint asserted ten claims: private nuisance, public nuisance, negligent hiring or supervision or retention of employees, negligence, federal due-process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, an equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state-created-danger theory, a claim that CCSF had an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom, a claim under the California Constitution, and a claim involving a statutory duty to provide medical care. The federal claims were brought against CCSF under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief from CCSF and damages and injunctive relief from Comcast.
Screening standard
Because the plaintiff was proceeding without paying the filing fee, the court was required to screen the complaint before directing service on the defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court could dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought relief from an immune defendant. The court applied the same basic pleading standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim: the complaint had to include enough factual matter to make a plausible claim for relief. The court also was required to read a self-represented litigant’s complaint liberally.
Federal claims
The court held that the complaint did not plausibly plead any federal claim and therefore did not establish federal-question jurisdiction.
For procedural due process, the court explained that a plaintiff generally must show a protected liberty or property interest, government deprivation of that interest, and denial of adequate procedural protections. The court said the plaintiff at most alleged that CCSF deprived him of a property interest or failed to provide adequate procedures.
For substantive due process, the court explained that government conduct must be arbitrary or conscience-shocking in the constitutional sense. It found that the allegations at most described negligence, not conduct meeting that standard.
The equal-protection claim also failed. The court said a § 1983 equal-protection claim requires allegations that the defendant intentionally discriminated based on membership in a protected class. The court found the plaintiff’s allegations conclusory and lacking any allegation of discriminatory intent based on protected-class membership.
The municipal-policy or custom claim, commonly called a Monell claim, failed as well. The court stated that, among other reasons, there were no underlying constitutional violations to support that claim.
State claims and disposition
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because the plaintiff had not stated a viable federal claim. It therefore did not reach the merits of those state claims.
The order identified the deficiencies and allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint addressing the federal claims by August 20, 2020. It stated that the court thought it unlikely the deficiencies could be cured because the case was fundamentally a state-law nuisance case. If the plaintiff did not amend, the court would reassign the case with a recommendation to dismiss it for lack of federal jurisdiction. The order also stated that the plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss the case by filing a one-page notice, which would operate as a dismissal without prejudice for the state claims.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.