Schulz v. Bay Area Motivate, LLC
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:19-cv-02134
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Schulz v. Bay Area Motivate, LLC, Judge Chesney granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss disability-access claims concerning San Francisco’s bikeshare program.
John Schulz’s disability-access claims against the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the City and County of San Francisco, Bay Area Motivate, LLC, Motivate International, Inc., and Lyft, Inc.; some claims and portions of claims were dismissed, while others were allowed to proceed.
What happened
John Schulz, who uses a wheelchair, alleged that defendants’ San Francisco Bikeshare Program violated disability-access laws because its bicycles were not usable by him and its adaptive bicycles were available only during limited hours. The defendants argued that his amended complaint still failed to state legally sufficient claims.
The court allowed Schulz’s claim under the main public-entity provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act to proceed against the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco. It dismissed his claims concerning designated public transportation, private-public-accommodation inventory requirements, and related portions of his Rehabilitation Act and California-law claims. The court also dismissed the portion of his California Disabled Persons Act claim based on a higher state standard.
Judge Maxine M. Chesney granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order dismissed the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action, dismissed specified portions of the Third through Sixth Causes of Action, and denied the motion in all other respects.
The detailed version
- Schulz v. Bay Area Motivate, LLC · No. 3:19-cv-02134
- Maxine Chesney
- Aug. 4, 2020
Background
John Schulz, who uses a wheelchair, challenged how defendants operated the San Francisco Bikeshare Program. The program included docked bicycles, dockless bicycles, and adaptive bicycles available for rent during a five-hour period each Sunday in Golden Gate Park. Schulz alleged that he could not use the docked or dockless bicycles because none was hand-powered, and that the limited availability of adaptive bicycles constructively excluded him from that part of the program.
The defendants were Bay Area Motivate, LLC; Motivate International, Inc.; Lyft, Inc.; the Metropolitan Transportation Commission; and the City and County of San Francisco. They moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.
Federal claims
The First Cause of Action asserted a claim under Title II, Part A, of the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco. Schulz alleged that extending the hours or days when staff were available to help customers use adaptive bicycles would be a reasonable accommodation. The court held that, at the pleading stage, the allegations identified a reasonable accommodation that could allow Schulz to use one component of the program. The court therefore denied dismissal of this claim.
The Second Cause of Action asserted that the program was a designated public transportation program covered by Title II, Part B, of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court had previously found that the Bikeshare Program was not such a program, and held that the Second Amended Complaint added no facts changing that conclusion. The court dismissed the Second Cause of Action.
The Third Cause of Action asserted a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco. Because Schulz based it on the same facts as his ADA claims, the court dismissed it to the extent it was based on the dismissed Second Cause of Action, but denied dismissal to the extent it was based on the First Cause of Action.
The Seventh Cause of Action asserted a Title III ADA claim against the Motivate Defendants. Schulz alleged that they should redistribute accessible bicycles they offered elsewhere to San Francisco’s bicycle docks. The court held that the ADA did not require a business to offer a particular good or service at every location merely because it offered that good or service at another location. The court dismissed the Seventh Cause of Action.
The Eighth Cause of Action asserted that the Motivate Defendants violated the ADA’s provision concerning specified public transportation services provided by private entities. The court held that Schulz added no facts establishing that the Bikeshare Program was a covered specified public transportation service. The court dismissed the Eighth Cause of Action.
California claims
The Fourth Cause of Action asserted a claim under California Government Code section 11135 against the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco. The court treated the claim as derivative of the First and Second Causes of Action. It dismissed the claim to the extent it was based on the Second Cause of Action and denied dismissal to the extent it was based on the First Cause of Action.
The Fifth Cause of Action asserted a claim under California’s Unruh Act against all defendants. Schulz based that claim on the same allegations as his ADA claims. The court dismissed it to the extent it was based on the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action, and denied dismissal to the extent it was based on the First Cause of Action.
The Sixth Cause of Action asserted claims under California Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1, including the California Disabled Persons Act, against all defendants. The court dismissed it to the extent it was based on the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action and on an alleged violation of a state standard. The court also stated that, as to the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and San Francisco, the Sixth Cause of Action would go forward. As to the Motivate Defendants, the court found that Schulz had not identified a state regulation or state law requiring more than the federal accessibility requirements discussed in the order.
Disposition
Judge Maxine M. Chesney granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action were dismissed. Specified portions of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action were also dismissed. In all other respects, the motion was denied.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.