Avenmarg v. Humboldt County

Background

Debra Avenmarg sued Humboldt County and other defendants. The order addressed only Humboldt County’s second motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The complaint alleged that County Counsel Blanck and the County violated Avenmarg’s constitutional rights involving privacy, familial association, and petitioning courts. It also alleged state-law claims for whistleblower retaliation, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The allegations arose from Avenmarg’s employment with the County, her relationship with GN, a former foster child and extended family member, and her motions seeking de facto parent status in GN’s dependency case. She alleged that Blanck required her to choose between her employment and withdrawing those motions, terminated her when she refused, later sought to disqualify her from dependency cases, and filed a complaint with the California state bar.

Federal Claims Against the County

The court analyzed Claims 1 through 6 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows suits for constitutional violations by government actors. Because the County is a municipality, Avenmarg had to plausibly allege that a County policy, custom, practice, final policymaker’s decision, or ratification caused the alleged constitutional violation. A municipality cannot be held liable merely because an employee allegedly acted unlawfully.

The court held that Avenmarg did not plausibly allege that Blanck had final policymaking authority. The California Rules of Professional Conduct, which Avenmarg relied on, did not specifically establish that Blanck had final authority to set County employment policy. The court also noted that Blanck’s conduct was reviewed by the County Board of Supervisors, meaning it was not unreviewable. The court further held that Avenmarg did not adequately allege ratification because she did not allege that the Board of Supervisors was involved in Blanck’s conduct or approved its basis.

The court dismissed Claims 1 through 5 against the County with prejudice because the alleged conduct underlying those claims could not support municipal liability and the defect could not be cured by amendment. For Claim 6, the court held that the alleged County policy barring County Counsel from taking placement of foster children was not the moving force behind the claimed constitutional deprivation. The court explained that Avenmarg was seeking de facto parent status and visitation when she was terminated, not trying to become GN’s foster parent. The court dismissed Claim 6 against the County with prejudice.

State-Law Claims

The court retained supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—in general, but declined to exercise it over Claim 8, Avenmarg’s California constitutional privacy claim. The court found that whether California’s Constitution permits a damages action for the alleged privacy violation was a novel and complex issue of state law. The court therefore declined supplemental jurisdiction over Claim 8.

The court dismissed Claim 7, the California Labor Code section 1102.5 whistleblower-retaliation claim, because Avenmarg did not allege that she reported or opposed conduct violating a statute or regulation, or that she refused to participate in conduct that would violate one. The court concluded that refusing to withdraw her dependency-case motions or quit her employment was not the type of protected activity covered by the statute.

The court dismissed Claim 9, the defamation claim, because the motions to disqualify and the state bar complaint were communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and were protected by California’s litigation privilege. The court dismissed Claim 10, intentional interference with contractual relations, because Avenmarg alleged only the possibility of losing assignments or income, not an actual breach or disruption of her contract; the alleged communications were also privileged.

The court dismissed Claims 11 and 12, for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. It held that the California workers’ compensation system generally provides the exclusive remedy for emotional injuries arising from the normal employment relationship, and Avenmarg had not alleged an applicable exception. The court also held that the post-termination publications were protected by the litigation privilege.

Disposition

Judge Robert M. Illman granted Humboldt County’s motion to dismiss. The court ordered that the claims against the County be dismissed. Claims 1 through 6 were dismissed with prejudice; Claims 7 and 9 through 12 were dismissed without a prejudice qualifier in the opinion’s stated disposition; and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Claim 8.