Vasquez v. City of San Jose

Background

The case concerns the December 25, 2018 shooting death of Jennifer Vasquez by San Jose police officers. According to the First Amended Complaint, police received a report of a drive-by shooting involving a white Nissan with tinted windows. Officer Marco Mercado later saw Vasquez’s white Toyota Camry, which did not have tinted windows, driving near the reported shooting location. The complaint alleged that Mercado mistakenly pursued Vasquez’s car.

Vasquez had an outstanding bench warrant and drove toward her parents’ house rather than surrendering immediately. Her car crashed into a fence and became stuck. Officers Marco Mercado, Mitchell Stimson, Eliseo Anaya, and Mark Koska boxed in the car and pointed their guns at Vasquez and her passenger. Vasquez then slowly tried to drive away, struck the front of an empty patrol car, and stopped. The complaint alleged that officers then shot Vasquez more than fifteen times, killing her at the scene.

Vasquez’s parents, Maria Elena Vasquez and Jose de Jesus Ramos, sued the City of San Jose and the officers. They asserted claims on Vasquez’s behalf for Fourth Amendment excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Fourteenth Amendment violation under § 1983, a California Civil Code § 52.1 claim known as the Bane Act, battery, and negligence. They also asserted the Fourteenth Amendment and negligence claims in their own right for losses connected to Vasquez’s death.

Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court was required at this stage to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiffs. The defendants also argued that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, a legal protection that can shield officials from liability unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim. The court denied the motion as to Claim One. It held that the complaint plausibly alleged that the officers used unreasonable deadly force. The court distinguished a prior Ninth Circuit decision involving a driver whose minivan was accelerating near officers, noting that the complaint here alleged that Vasquez’s car was stopped and completely boxed in on an empty street. The court also held that the defendants had not shown, from the face of the complaint, that qualified immunity applied.

Fourteenth Amendment claim. The opinion’s discussion section says the motion was denied as to Claim Three. It reasoned that the allegations—that Vasquez crashed, drove slowly into a patrol car, and then stopped—could support an inference that the officers had an opportunity to deliberate before shooting. For a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on use of force, the court described the relevant question as whether the conduct “shocked the conscience.”

However, the conclusion states that the motion was “GRANTED as to Claim Three,” that Claim Three was “DISMISSED without prejudice,” and that the plaintiffs could file an amended complaint by September 16, 2020. The opinion therefore contains an internal inconsistency about the disposition of Claim Three.

Bane Act claim. The court granted the motion as to Claim Four. It held that the complaint did not adequately allege the specific intent required under the Bane Act: an intent not only to use force, but to use force that was unreasonable or more than necessary. The court noted that the complaint said the officers pursued Vasquez by mistake and did not allege that they acted with the particular purpose of violating her rights.

Battery and negligence claims. The court denied the motion as to Claims Six and Seven. It concluded that, for the same reasons the complaint plausibly alleged unreasonable conduct for the excessive-force claim, the battery and negligence claims also survived the motion to dismiss.

Disposition

The order is titled an order “granting in part and denying in part” the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The body states that the motion was denied as to Claim One, denied as to Claim Three, granted as to Claim Four, and denied as to Claims Six and Seven. The conclusion instead states that the motion was granted as to Claim Three, that Claim Three was dismissed without prejudice, and that the motion was otherwise denied. Because these statements conflict, the precise final disposition of Claim Three is unclear from the opinion text. The order was signed by United States District Judge Edward J. Davila.