Martinez v. City of Santa Rosa

Background

During Black Lives Matter protests, Santa Rosa police officers used tear gas and projectiles on protesters on at least two nights. Marqus Martinez and Michaela Staggs alleged that they were seriously injured. They brought a proposed class action on behalf of themselves and other Santa Rosa protesters.

The plaintiffs asserted two constitutional claims: (1) that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) that the officers retaliated against protesters for constitutionally protected activity and because of the content of their message about racism and police brutality, in violation of the First Amendment. They asked for a preliminary injunction—an order issued before final judgment to prevent similar conduct while the case continues.

Legal Standard

The court explained that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. The plaintiffs had to show a likelihood of success on their claims, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of hardships favored them, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. If the balance of hardships strongly favored the plaintiffs, they could instead show serious questions going to the merits.

Because the plaintiffs sued the City, they also had to satisfy the municipal-liability rule commonly associated with Monell. That rule requires more than proof that individual employees violated the Constitution. The plaintiffs also had to show that the employees acted pursuant to a City policy or custom. The court said this requirement applies to requests for an injunction as well as requests for damages.

Court’s Analysis

For the excessive-force claim, the plaintiffs had to show that the officers’ decision to fire tear gas and projectiles was likely made under a Santa Rosa policy or custom, rather than being an isolated mistake by individual officers. For the retaliation claim, they had to show that Santa Rosa itself likely had a policy or custom of retaliating against protesters for protected activity, not merely that some officers failed to respect speech regardless of its message.

The court described the evidence relating to the officers’ conduct as murky and said some of it suggested that the officers may have violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and perhaps their First Amendment rights. But the plaintiffs had not attempted to show a likelihood of success on municipal liability, and the limited evidence barely addressed that issue.

The opinion also briefly noted the plaintiffs’ reference to alleged failure to train officers in using tear gas and projectiles. The court explained that such a theory generally requires proof that the City was deliberately indifferent to the rights of people with whom its officers would come into contact. The plaintiffs made no real attempt to show deliberate indifference.

Disposition

Judge Vince Chhabria denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The denial was without prejudice to filing a renewed motion supported by evidence addressing municipal liability. The court also stated that, if the plaintiffs renewed the motion, they should consider whether they needed to seek provisional class certification to obtain an injunction benefiting the entire proposed class.