Lindell v. United States of America

Background

Michael J. Lindell and MyPillow, Inc. sued the United States of America, Merrick Garland in his official capacity as Attorney General, the United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, and Christopher Wray in his official capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They alleged that federal agents violated Lindell’s rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments when they seized a cellphone from him on September 13, 2022, while executing a search warrant in a Hardee’s drive-through lane in Mankato, Minnesota.

The warrant had been issued on September 7, 2022, based on an 80-page affidavit. It authorized the seizure of a cellphone used by Lindell and owned by MyPillow to obtain evidence of possible identity theft, intentional damage to a protected computer, and conspiracy to commit those offenses. The warrant materials were sealed. The court reviewed them privately and confirmed that they described the government’s ongoing investigation, including confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, recorded communications, and people who were not targets of the warrant.

The complaint asserted five counts involving alleged First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment violations. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the warrant was overly broad, that agents improperly tracked Lindell, that agents restricted his movement and delayed his request to call a lawyer, and that the government withheld information from the magistrate judge. The plaintiffs sought declarations, return of the cellphone and data, and access to the warrant affidavit.

Motions

The plaintiffs filed two motions addressed in this opinion. First, they moved for access to the search-warrant application materials, essentially seeking the affidavit supporting the warrant. They relied on the First Amendment, the common-law right to inspect judicial records, the Fourth Amendment, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.

Second, they moved for a preliminary injunction and return of property under Rule 41(g). They sought the cellphone’s return, an order stopping the government from accessing data stored on it, and an order prohibiting access to information already taken from it.

Access to warrant materials

The court explained that access rights are qualified rather than absolute. Under the First Amendment, access may be restricted when the government shows a compelling interest and the restriction is narrowly tailored. The common-law right to inspect judicial records is also subject to limits. The court further explained that even courts recognizing a pre-indictment Fourth Amendment or Rule 41-based right to inspect warrant materials generally allow access to be denied when a compelling government interest requires continued secrecy.

The court found that the government had shown such an interest. The affidavit described the nature, scope, and direction of the ongoing criminal investigation and referred to recorded communications, confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, and individuals who were not targets. Disclosure could give Lindell and others insight into the investigation and compromise it. The privacy interests of uncharged individuals also supported continued sealing.

The court determined that redaction was not a practical alternative because the affidavit was extensive and its references to people and activities appeared throughout the document. The absence of a federal indictment weighed heavily against disclosure. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments based on alleged violations of the local sealing rule and the public nature of the warrant’s execution, finding that those points did not overcome the government’s demonstrated interest.

The court therefore denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Obtain Access to Warrant Application Materials.

Preliminary injunction and return of the cellphone

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. The court considered the usual factors: likely irreparable harm, the balance of harms, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. The plaintiffs had the burden to establish those factors.

The court treated the pre-indictment Rule 41(g) request as a suit in equity rather than an ordinary criminal-procedure motion. It explained that equitable relief for return of property in this setting requires showing callous disregard of constitutional rights, irreparable injury, no adequate legal remedy, and an individual interest in and need for the property.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not established the first three factors. Regarding the Fourth Amendment, it found that a neutral magistrate judge had reviewed a sworn affidavit and determined that probable cause supported a warrant identifying the offenses, the person, and the property to be searched. The agents acted in objective good faith in relying on the warrant, and the court found no callous disregard in how they executed it. The court also concluded that the warrant was not an unconstitutional general warrant and that the warrant’s electronic-search process complied with the applicable two-step procedure.

Regarding the First Amendment, the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the warrant unlawfully targeted protected speech, association, press activity, or petitioning. The court distinguished cases involving indiscriminate collection of membership or donor information and found that the plaintiffs had not shown government retaliation for speech or association.

Regarding the alleged withholding of information from the warrant application, the court treated the claim as essentially a Fourth Amendment claim under the rule associated with Franks v. Delaware. That rule concerns intentionally or recklessly misleading omissions in a warrant application. The court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged facts showing that the government omitted information intending to mislead or recklessly disregarding whether the affidavit would be misleading. They also had not shown that adding the allegedly omitted information would defeat probable cause.

The court found no irreparable injury. Lindell had acknowledged that the cellphone’s contents had been backed up only days before the seizure, and the government had established procedures to protect potentially attorney-client-privileged material. The court also found that unsupported claims of business disruption or possible future harm were insufficient.

The court further found that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. If criminal charges were filed, Lindell could challenge the search through a motion to suppress. The court also noted that, unless the cellphone became subject to forfeiture, the property could be returned after criminal proceedings ended.

Although the plaintiffs had an ownership and possessory interest in the cellphone and an interest in its private information, the court found that this factor alone did not justify equitable relief. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs could not use the civil case to interfere with the ongoing federal criminal investigation. The court applied the principle that equitable courts ordinarily should not restrain criminal investigations when an adequate legal remedy exists and irreparable injury has not been shown.

Finally, the court found that the balance of harms and public-interest factors favored the government. An injunction would interfere with effective law enforcement and delay criminal investigations and proceedings.

The court therefore denied the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and for Return of Property. The order did not resolve the plaintiffs’ underlying constitutional claims through a final merits judgment; it denied the requested preliminary and ancillary relief.

Disposition

The court ordered that both motions be denied and directed that judgment be entered accordingly. Judge Eric C. Tostrud signed the opinion and order on November 3, 2022.