Hussain v. Berryhill

Background

Hussain appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income. He initially alleged disability beginning June 1, 2011, then amended the alleged onset date to March 23, 2015. An administrative law judge held a hearing and issued an unfavorable decision on March 29, 2018.

The administrative law judge found severe impairments involving schizoaffective disorder or bipolar disorder and polysubstance abuse involving alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamines. The judge concluded that Hussain’s mental impairments, including substance-use disorders, met section 12.04 of the listed impairments. But the judge also concluded that, if Hussain stopped using substances, he would not meet or equal a listed impairment and could perform work with limitations involving task complexity, work-related decisions, and social interaction. The judge therefore found him not disabled because he could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision based on the record when the court determines that no trial is needed to resolve the motion.

Medical-opinion evidence

The court held that the administrative law judge did not adequately evaluate the opinions of state-agency psychological consultants D. Lucila, M.D., and Karen Ying, M.D. Both consultants found Hussain moderately limited in his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek and to work at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number or length of rest periods. The administrative law judge did not mention Lucila’s opinion and did not state what weight he gave Ying’s opinion. The residual functional capacity assessment also did not include limitations addressing these endurance and rest-period issues.

The court found the error was not harmless because a vocational expert testified that a worker who needed rest periods for about 5 to 10 percent of the day would be unemployable if the need approached 10 percent day after day. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not explain inconsistencies between the consultants’ opinions, why Ying’s opinion appeared to receive more weight than Lucila’s, or how those opinions compared with other evidence.

Drug-and-alcohol analysis

When drug addiction or alcoholism is present, the administrative law judge must determine whether the claimant would still be disabled if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol. The court found that the administrative law judge’s analysis was not detailed enough to explain the conclusion that Hussain would not be disabled if he stopped all substance use.

The administrative law judge relied on an examination by Jonathan Howard, Psy.D., conducted when Hussain was using some marijuana and alcohol, stating that the examination showed Hussain’s functioning in the absence of drugs and alcohol. The court said the decision did not adequately explain how an examination conducted during marijuana and alcohol use supported that conclusion. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why he relied on Howard’s opinion while rejecting opinions from other medical sources, including opinions stating that Hussain’s impairments were not caused by substance intoxication, dependence, or withdrawal.

The court further found that portions of the administrative law judge’s summary of the record were unsupported or unclear. For example, a cited record page did not link Hussain’s symptoms to substance use, and another cited document noted recent marijuana use rather than abstinence. The court explained that a period of sobriety is not required, but the substance-use analysis still must be supported by substantial evidence.

Hussain’s testimony and his mother’s report

The administrative law judge tied the assessment of Hussain’s statements about the intensity and effects of his symptoms to the residual functional capacity assessment. Because the court found the residual functional capacity assessment erroneous, it required the administrative law judge to reassess Hussain’s testimony after properly evaluating the medical evidence and work-capacity assessment.

The administrative law judge also did not discuss the third-party function report completed by Hussain’s mother or state what weight, if any, the report received. The court held that the report was competent evidence about Hussain’s symptoms and how his impairments affected his ability to work. Because the court also found that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Hussain’s testimony, it was unclear whether the failure to address the mother’s report affected the disability determination. The court therefore required correction of this issue on remand.

Residual functional capacity and vocational testimony

Residual functional capacity means the most a claimant can do despite his impairments. The court found that the administrative law judge’s assessment—full-range work at all exertional levels, limited to simple routine tasks and simple work-related decisions, with occasional appropriate responses to supervisors, coworkers, and the public—did not adequately address limitations identified by Lucila, Ying, and Howard.

The administrative law judge did not explain why he disregarded limitations concerning completing a normal workday or workweek, maintaining a consistent pace, adapting to workplace changes, and concentrating on usual work tasks. The court concluded that the residual functional capacity analysis was incomplete and required remand.

Because the residual functional capacity and other parts of the decision were erroneous, the court said the administrative law judge must also consider whether the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert need revision so they accurately reflect Hussain’s limitations and restrictions.

Disposition

The court held that further administrative proceedings were appropriate because unresolved issues remained and the record did not clearly require a finding that Hussain was disabled if the evidence were properly evaluated. It granted Hussain’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court stated that it did not intend to limit the scope of the remand.