Howe v. Mendocino County

Background

Barbara Howe, Jani Sheppard, and Carol Morgan were current or former employees of Mendocino County’s Health and Human Services Agency. Their First Amended Complaint asserted four federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil-rights law that allows claims against people acting under state law for violating federal rights:

The complaint also included California claims, but the opinion’s discussion focused on the four federal causes of action. The federal claims were brought against Mendocino County and Tammy Moss-Chandler, William Schurtz, and Sharon Convery in their individual capacities.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. To proceed, a complaint must allege enough facts to make relief reasonably plausible, rather than merely possible. The court generally assumes well-pleaded allegations are true when deciding such a motion, but need not accept conclusory statements or unreasonable factual inferences.

For claims against the county under § 1983, the plaintiffs had to allege that county employees or agents acted under an official policy, practice, or custom that violated their rights. The county could not be held liable merely because it employed the people accused of misconduct. For claims against individual defendants, the plaintiffs had to allege each defendant’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation.

Court’s analysis

The court found that all four federal claims inadequately described the county’s alleged policies, practices, or customs. Although the complaint repeatedly referred to “illegal policies and procedures” and quoted an alleged grand-jury report, it did not sufficiently identify the policies or connect the allegations together.

For the first free-speech claim, the court stated that the plaintiffs had not alleged what actions, if any, the defendants took to chill protected speech. The court also observed that this claim appeared to overlap with the second claim, which it understood to be centered on retaliation.

For the second claim, the court found that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment actions, or adequately pleaded a causal connection between the speech and the alleged retaliation.

For the third claim, the complaint asserted that the defendants treated the plaintiffs differently from similarly situated county employees but did not adequately allege that the difference in treatment was based on membership in a protected class. The court found that the references to race, sexual orientation, and age discrimination were supported by few facts and often lacked context. It directed that any amended allegations should explain, for each plaintiff, how that plaintiff was treated differently because of protected-class membership.

For the fourth claim, the court found that the allegations were nearly identical to those supporting the third claim and that it was unclear what process each plaintiff allegedly had been denied.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the first through fourth causes of action without prejudice. The plaintiffs were required to file an amended complaint by November 13, 2020. The court stated that this would likely be the last time it granted leave to amend and instructed the plaintiffs to consider which defendants they wished to sue on which claims. The opinion does not specify which other portions of the motion were denied.