Vernacchio v. Davis

Background

John F. Vernacchio, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this self-represented civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed the complaint under the prisoner-screening law, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to identify claims that may proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant.

Vernacchio alleged that prison officials removed him from his prison job on March 9, 2018, when he was 65. He alleged that he had worked consistently and without incident for 16 months, but that a prison policy or practice required terminating an inmate’s employment upon reaching age 65. He claimed that a committee terminated him despite his explanation that he was healthy and able to work.

He alleged that Ron Davis, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, Dr. E. Tootle, and Daniel A. Smith were responsible for drafting, implementing, or following the policy or practice. He asserted an equal-protection claim based on age discrimination and a separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Age-discrimination claims

The court explained that a claim under § 1983 requires an alleged violation of a constitutional or federal-law right by a person acting under state law. For an equal-protection claim based on age, the plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination, and the age classification must be evaluated under the rational-basis test.

The court also noted that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or ADEA, might apply if Vernacchio’s prison work involved compensation or training, or resembled work release rather than forced labor. If the ADEA applies, the court stated, it is the exclusive remedy for age-discrimination-in-employment claims in the Ninth Circuit, meaning the plaintiff may recover under only one of the ADEA or equal-protection theories. The court said it was not possible or necessary at the screening stage to decide which theory best fit because the complaint lacked information about the prison job’s structure.

Liberally construing the complaint, the court held that it stated cognizable claims—claims sufficient to proceed past initial screening—under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the ADEA. The court found that the allegations adequately linked Davis, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, Dr. E. Tootle, and Smith to the alleged age-discrimination policy or practice.

Unnamed defendants and emotional-distress claim

The court allowed the use of John Doe # 1 and John Doe # 2 at the initial screening stage, but explained that those defendants could not be served until their real names were identified. Vernacchio was required to promptly investigate their identities and provide the information to the court in an amended complaint. He had 90 days from the date of the order to identify them, or they would be dismissed without prejudice to filing another action against them.

The court dismissed Vernacchio’s separate intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It applied 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which bars a prisoner from bringing a federal civil action for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or a sexual act. The court clarified that this limitation applied only to the separate mental- or emotional-injury claim and did not require physical injury for all prisoner civil-rights claims.

Disposition and case management

The court stated that the complaint presented cognizable claims against warden Ron Davis, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, chief medical executive Dr. E. Tootle, and acting chief medical executive Daniel A. Smith for alleged violations under the Equal Protection Clause and the ADEA. It dismissed all other claims and defendants.

The clerk was directed to issue a summons, and the United States Marshal was directed to serve Davis, Dr. E. Tootle, and Smith without requiring advance payment of fees. The court also set deadlines for defendants’ summary-judgment or other dispositive motion, Vernacchio’s opposition, and any reply. Discovery could proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The order did not decide whether Vernacchio would ultimately prevail on the age-discrimination claims.