Williams v. United Airlines, Inc.

Background

Clarence Williams, who identifies as African American, worked for United Airlines as a commercial airline pilot and later as a Fleet Technical Manager for the Boeing 787 fleet. During a required flight standards meeting on September 21, 2016, Williams remained connected to the conference call after the portion he attended ended. He heard John Weigland tell senior managers to meet again after a break. Williams was not a senior manager, was not invited to the second meeting, and knew he was not supposed to participate in it.

Williams listened to Weigland discuss African American pilots who had previously sued United for race discrimination. Williams then recorded part of the conversation using his iPhone. No one gave him permission to listen or record the second meeting.

Williams later sued United for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. United moved for summary judgment and also moved to exclude evidence based on its contention that Williams obtained the evidence in violation of the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520. United argued that it could use Williams’s eavesdropping and recording under the after-acquired-evidence doctrine to show that it would have terminated him, which would reduce damages for his later return to flying.

Wiretap Act analysis

The Wiretap Act generally prohibits intentionally intercepting or using a device to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications. The court explained that intentionally remaining on a telephone line can qualify as an interception. It also explained that the Act contains exceptions, including an exception for a person who is a participant in the communication or has prior consent, unless the interception is made for a criminal or tortious purpose.

The court determined that Williams did not qualify as a participant in the second meeting. He did not speak, no participant knew he was listening, he had not received consent, and his participation in the first meeting had ended. The court also concluded that Weigland had a reasonable expectation that no one outside the limited group of participants was secretly listening.

The court did not decide whether Weigland’s statements were an “oral communication” or a “wire communication” under the Act. It held that the business-extension exception applied to both categories, so that classification was unnecessary to resolve the motion. The court stated that the communication was more likely a wire communication because it traveled by telephone between states and Williams intentionally listened and recorded it.

Business-extension exception

The business-extension exception can apply when a company furnishes an extension telephone to a user in the ordinary course of business and the interception also occurs in the ordinary course of business. The court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had not defined the second requirement and that other federal appellate courts had adopted different tests.

The court found that Williams had not offered a business reason for his interception. He did not, for example, provide the recording to United’s human-resources department; instead, he used the evidence in his own discrimination lawsuit. The court therefore concluded that the interception fell outside an established business practice and lacked a valid business purpose. The court stated that, absent an exception, Williams had violated the Act.

Disposition

The court held that United could not rely on Williams’s eavesdropping and recording to argue that it would have fired him while also seeking to prevent Williams from using the contents of the conversation. By affirmatively relying on the evidence in support of its after-acquired-evidence defense and offering it with its summary judgment motion, United had consented to its admission for purposes of this dispute.

The court denied United’s motion to exclude the evidence. It held that Williams could present his explanation of the incident, including the recording. The order did not decide United’s separate motion for summary judgment.