Jiau v. Tews

Background

Winifred Jiau originally filed this action without a lawyer as a petition challenging the denial of her requested transfer from prison to a residential re-entry center. She was later released from federal custody. The court converted the action into a damages action under Bivens, a judicially recognized remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officials, and allowed Jiau to amend claims involving due process, equal protection, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Those claims were later resolved against her, and the appeals court affirmed those rulings. The appeals court also affirmed dismissal of her earlier deliberate-indifference and retaliation claims but directed the court to allow her to amend the deliberate-indifference claim.

The court then permitted Jiau to file a third amended complaint, explaining that the amended claim could not be based only on the denial of a prison transfer. In that complaint, Jiau alleged that she had serious cardiac problems after an August 2012 heart failure, that her condition worsened without necessary treatment, that she was not taken to a cardiologist for a needed catheter ablation, and that she received what she believed was the wrong medication. She also alleged that Defendant Randy L. Tews delayed or interfered with a cardiology consultation, denied her release to a residential re-entry center where she could obtain treatment, required her to perform a janitorial job despite her heart condition, and punished her with disciplinary charges after she sought a job change.

Court’s analysis

The court conducted the required preliminary review of the amended complaint. It held that, when Jiau’s allegations were read liberally, they stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Such a claim requires allegations that the medical need was serious and that the official knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to the prisoner’s health or safety.

Tews moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. He argued that Jiau had not exhausted her available prison grievance remedies. The court declined to resolve that issue on the dismissal motion because the complaint did not clearly show a failure to exhaust, and the record did not include copies of Jiau’s 14 administrative complaints. The court said the exhaustion issue could be raised in a later motion for summary judgment supported by a more complete record.

Tews also argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Jiau’s claim was really a challenge to her residential re-entry center placement. The court rejected that argument at this stage, explaining that the third amended complaint alleged more than the denial of a transfer: it alleged that Jiau’s heart problems were left untreated while the transfer was denied and that Tews acted with bad faith and reckless disregard for the risk of harm.

The court rejected Tews’s argument that the claim arose in a new Bivens context that the Supreme Court had not authorized. The court concluded that Jiau’s claim was an Eighth Amendment inadequate-medical-treatment claim like the claim for which the Supreme Court had recognized a Bivens damages remedy in Carlson v. Green. Because the claim was not a new context, the court did not conduct the additional analysis concerning special factors that might counsel against recognizing a Bivens remedy.

The court also found that Jiau had pleaded enough facts at the dismissal stage to state a cognizable Bivens claim against Tews. The court noted that Bivens liability requires personal responsibility rather than liability based only on a supervisor’s position, and it concluded that Jiau’s allegations concerning Tews’s alleged involvement were sufficient for the case to proceed at that point.

Finally, the court declined to resolve qualified immunity on the pleadings. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from damages when the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established legal right. The court found that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs was clearly established as an Eighth Amendment violation, but stated that whether Tews could reasonably have believed his specific conduct was lawful was better considered on summary judgment, after he could present evidence.

Disposition

The court found that Jiau’s third amended complaint stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim. It denied Tews’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to filing a motion for summary judgment. The court allowed Tews 28 days to renew his arguments through such a motion and set briefing deadlines. It denied Jiau’s motion to strike Tews’s motion as moot and terminated the two motions from the docket.