Gumber v. Fagundes

Background

Stephanie Ann Gumber sued Keith Fagundes and other defendants. The court considered Gumber’s motion to remove, her motion for an emergency injunction, and a recommendation from Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero that the complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim. Gumber filed a document titled an “opposition to motion to dismiss,” which the court treated as an objection to the report and recommendation.

Motions and screening standard

The court adopted Judge Spero’s report and recommendation in every respect. It denied the motion to remove and denied the motion for an emergency injunction. The court overruled Gumber’s objection.

Because the case was being screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court applied the same legal standard used for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That standard asks whether the complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough facts to make relief plausible.

Claims

The court dismissed the claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 912, 1341, 1702, and 1201(c), the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611 and following, and 34 U.S.C. § 12601 because those provisions do not provide a private right of action—that is, they do not authorize a private person to sue under them.

The court dismissed the claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1986 with prejudice because Gumber did not allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. A dismissal with prejudice bars further litigation of that claim.

The court dismissed the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because the complaint did not identify a RICO violation or allege facts showing that a RICO violation proximately caused Gumber’s harm. The court granted leave to amend that claim.

The court also dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It held that the claim was based on defendants’ efforts to charge Gumber with a crime and pursue the criminal case against her in state court. The court stated that a prosecutor has absolute immunity for conduct closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. In the discussion section, the court dismissed the section 1983 claim with prejudice based on prosecutorial immunity, while also allowing amendment if Gumber intended to allege a constitutional violation unrelated to her prosecution.

Disposition

The court concluded that all claims were dismissed under section 1915 because the complaint failed to state a valid claim. It stated that the claims lacking a private right of action and the section 1986 claim were dismissed with prejudice. The order stated that Gumber could amend only the RICO and section 1983 claims, within 30 days, to correct the deficiencies identified by the court. It also stated that no new claims or parties could be added without defendants’ agreement or leave of court.

The opinion contains an apparent inconsistency about the section 1983 claim: the discussion calls that claim dismissed with prejudice, but the conclusion says Gumber may amend the section 1983 claim and refers to the RICO and section 1983 claims as dismissed without prejudice. The summary does not resolve that inconsistency.