Sarmiento v. Marquez

Background

Danielle Sarmiento and Michael Sanchez alleged that they were former foster parents and de facto parents of a child they hoped to formally adopt. They sued the County of Santa Cruz and employees of the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other laws. Their allegations concerned religious discrimination, due-process violations, the County’s policies and practices, emotional-distress claims, California-law claims, and requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Plaintiffs alleged that social worker Luz Sanclemente asked Sarmiento whether she believed in God and Jesus Christ. They contended that defendants then attempted to remove the child from their care in retaliation for plaintiffs not appearing to be Christians. Plaintiffs also challenged the County’s conduct during administrative and state-court proceedings involving the child’s placement. The opinion states that plaintiffs prevailed in a 12-day dependency trial and that the child remained with them afterward; the child was later reunited with the biological father through a separate family-maintenance process.

Defendants’ Motion and Pleading Deficiencies

Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court had previously instructed plaintiffs to identify, for each cause of action, the right allegedly violated, the responsible defendant, the elements of the claim, and the specific conduct satisfying those elements.

The court found that the second amended complaint still failed to provide adequate notice. It did not identify a particular defendant responsible for the alleged religious-discrimination violation, state the necessary elements of the claims, or explain how the alleged conduct satisfied those elements. The complaint also repeated generalized allegations about individual conduct across multiple causes of action without differentiating which allegations supported which claim. The court dismissed the complaint for failing to provide the short and plain statement required by Rule 8.

Federal Claims

The court separately concluded that none of the federal claims stated a claim for relief.

For the First Amendment free-exercise theory, the court held that asking plaintiffs about their religious beliefs did not, as alleged, coerce them to act contrary to their beliefs or place substantial pressure on them to change their behavior. Plaintiffs did not identify any action they took differently because of the questioning or allege a condition requiring them to convert to Christianity in order to keep custody of the child.

For the First Amendment retaliation theory, the court found that plaintiffs alleged only speculation and conclusory assertions connecting the religious questioning to the defendants’ conduct. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege religious animus or a sufficiently substantial causal relationship between protected activity and adverse government action. The court also stated that plaintiffs, as de facto parents, did not have a federally protected constitutional interest in their relationship with the child or in the child-custody procedures at issue.

The court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to bring a California constitutional claim through § 1983 because § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by federal law, not state constitutional rights.

On due process, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not establish a protected liberty or property interest. The procedural rights given to de facto parents under California Rule of Court 5.534—being present at hearings, having counsel, and presenting evidence—were only procedural protections and did not contain substantive standards or mandatory language controlling the outcome. The court also relied on precedent stating that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued custody of a foster child. The due-process claim was therefore dismissed.

The court dismissed the claim seeking to hold the County liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services. A Monell claim requires a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy, practice, or custom. The court found that plaintiffs had not alleged a constitutional deprivation and had not plausibly identified a County policy or practice supported by factual allegations.

The court also dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to deprive them of civil rights, but the court found that they did not plausibly allege an agreement aimed at denying equal protection, discriminatory animus, or specific facts supporting the alleged conspiracy.

State-Law Claims and Other Requests

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—over the remaining state claims because the federal claims supplied the only basis for original federal jurisdiction. The court therefore did not reach defendants’ special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.

The court granted defendants’ administrative motion to seal documents and request for judicial notice. It denied plaintiffs’ request to submit additional materials responding to the judicial-notice request and denied their request for Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel because plaintiffs had not complied with applicable procedural requirements and the request also failed on the merits.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The federal claims were dismissed with prejudice. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice to filing in state court.