Scott Crawford v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Background

Three plaintiffs—Scott Crawford, Stephan Namisnak, and Francis Falls—use electric wheelchairs. Crawford lives in Jackson, Mississippi; Namisnak and Falls live in New Orleans, Louisiana. They alleged that Uber Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary Rasier, Inc. violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act by not offering wheelchair-accessible vehicle service, called UberWAV, in those cities. The plaintiffs had not downloaded the Uber application but stated under oath that they would use Uber if it offered rides accommodating electric wheelchairs.

Both sides moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no genuine dispute of important fact exists and that one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Uber also filed motions seeking to exclude expert testimony, and the plaintiffs moved to strike testimony submitted by Uber’s witness Niraj Patel.

Standing

For their requests for court-ordered future relief, the plaintiffs needed to show an actual injury, including a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. At the summary-judgment stage, they needed only to show a genuine factual question about standing. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s deterrent-effect doctrine, the court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to download the Uber application did not defeat standing. Because they knew UberWAV was unavailable in their cities, downloading the application and creating an account could have been futile. Their stated intent to use Uber once accessible service became available, together with the surrounding evidence, was sufficient to create a factual dispute.

Uber’s coverage under the ADA

Title III’s transportation provision applies to a private entity primarily engaged in transporting people whose operations affect commerce. The court held that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that Uber met this definition. Uber had publicly described itself as a transportation company and exercised extensive control over aspects of its transportation system, including the cities and products in which it operated, ride prices, vehicle requirements, driver standards, and other operating rules. The court rejected Uber’s argument that it merely sold technology rather than transportation. It ruled that no reasonable jury could conclude, on the evidence presented, that Uber was not a covered entity under the transportation provision.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ arguments concerning Rasier could be applied to both defendants because Uber had not sufficiently explained why Rasier’s business differed in a way that would make it categorically immune from those arguments.

Claims under sections 12184(b)(1) and (b)(5)

The plaintiffs argued under section 12184(b)(1) that Uber’s vehicle requirements screened out people with disabilities. The court held that this theory was raised improperly for the first time at summary judgment. Although the complaint referred to a technological barrier to providing UberWAV, the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment theory focused on Uber’s restrictions on the types of vehicles drivers could use for UberX. The court ruled that section 12184(b)(1) could not provide a basis for relief.

The plaintiffs also relied on section 12184(b)(5), which addresses the purchase or lease of certain new, inaccessible vans and allows an equivalent level of service as a defense. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation that Uber’s alleged purchase of inaccessible vans required equivalent accessible service throughout its transportation system. It also stated that the record contained a factual dispute about whether Uber owned or purchased the vehicles at issue. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not recover under section 12184(b)(5).

Reasonable-modification claim

Section 12184(b)(2) incorporates the requirement that a covered entity make reasonable changes to its policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid disability discrimination, unless the change would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods or services. The court rejected Uber’s argument that wheelchair-accessible service could never qualify as a reasonable modification under this provision. The court explained that reasonableness is a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that can include the modification’s effectiveness, its cost, and whether it would impose an undue financial or administrative burden or fundamentally alter Uber’s services.

The plaintiffs sought accessible service similar to UberWAV service offered in other cities. They identified possible methods including contracting with a commercial fleet operator, changing restrictions and creating driver incentives, and restoring a vehicle-leasing model. Uber disputed the availability, effectiveness, and cost of those methods and argued that requiring accessible service would fundamentally alter its business. Because the parties presented sharply conflicting evidence, the court held that the reasonableness of the proposed modification could not be decided on summary judgment. Both summary-judgment motions were denied as to the section 12184(b)(2) claim, leaving the issue for a fact finder.

Evidentiary motions

The court denied Uber’s motion to exclude Meera Joshi entirely. Although Uber challenged several of her opinions, it did not generally challenge her credentials, the information she used, or her methods. The court also denied Uber’s motion to exclude plaintiffs’ expert James Cooper. The court noted that particular opinions might raise admissibility issues, but Uber’s objections did not justify excluding him completely.

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike Patel’s declaration because the motion was improper under the court’s local rule. The court noted that some of Patel’s opinions approached the boundary between lay and expert testimony, but his declaration would not be excluded at that time; the issue could be raised again at trial.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment. It denied both motions in limine and denied the motion to strike.