NAACP of San Jose/ Silicon Valley v. City Of San Jose

Background

This civil-rights case arose from protests in San Jose between May 29 and May 31, 2020, responding to the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiffs were the NAACP of San Jose/Silicon Valley, the San Jose Peace and Justice Center, and twelve individual plaintiffs. They alleged that San Jose police officers used impact munitions, chemical agents, flashbangs, batons, and arrests against people who were protesting or assisting protesters. The complaint asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, and California claims.

The defendants included the City of San Jose and individual city and police officials. The defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether the complaint states legally sufficient claims. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and generally declined to resolve factual disputes or qualified-immunity issues that would benefit from a developed evidentiary record.

General liability issues

The court declined to issue a blanket dismissal based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established legal right, but the court found that the defense often depended on facts specific to each alleged incident and was better suited to summary judgment.

The court also declined to dismiss the municipal and supervisory defendants at the pleading stage. The plaintiffs alleged that city policymakers adopted policies allowing expanded use of riot weapons and imposed the curfew, and that officials failed to train officers adequately or encouraged, tolerated, or ratified unconstitutional conduct. The court found those allegations sufficient at this stage, noting that the defendants’ own after-action report stated that crowd-control training had been minimal and infrequent and that commanders lacked sufficient training and experience.

Claim-by-claim rulings

Third cause of action—First Amendment. The plaintiffs asserted a viewpoint-discrimination theory and a curfew-related theory. The court held that the allegations that officers used force against people who were peacefully demonstrating, kneeling, praying, playing guitar, trying to walk away, or standing with their hands raised were sufficient to plead that the plaintiffs’ protest activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ conduct. The court therefore DENIED the motion to dismiss the viewpoint-discrimination portion of the third cause of action.

The court also DENIED the motion to dismiss the curfew-related portion of the third cause of action as to defendants Sykes, Liccardo, Garcia, and the City of San Jose. The court concluded that it lacked an evidentiary record to decide at the pleading stage whether the citywide curfew was narrowly tailored or left open sufficient alternative ways to communicate. The court GRANTED the motion to dismiss the curfew-related portion as to the remaining individual defendants, without leave to amend, because the complaint did not allege that they were involved in issuing the curfew.

Fourth cause of action—excessive force. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that most plaintiffs had not been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Relying on the alleged use of intentionally applied force that restricted movement, the court concluded that each plaintiff adequately alleged a seizure. The court DENIED the motion to dismiss the excessive-force claim.

Fifth cause of action—wrongful arrest. The court DENIED the motion to dismiss this claim. The claim involved Cartwright, Lee, Naemeh, Swift, the NAACP, and the San Jose Peace and Justice Center, and was asserted against Dwyer, Garcia, Sykes, and the City of San Jose. The court found that determining whether the arrests were supported by probable cause required examining the circumstances of each arrest. It also declined to resolve at this stage the parties’ conflicting allegations about whether Naemeh threw frozen water bottles and the defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments.

Sixth cause of action—equal protection. The court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that they were targeted because of their protest viewpoint, but did not adequately allege that they were targeted because of race or another protected status, as required for the asserted equal-protection theory. The court GRANTED the motion to dismiss the equal-protection claim without leave to amend.

Seventh cause of action—freedom of movement. The court GRANTED the motion to dismiss this claim without leave to amend. The plaintiffs had not identified authority supporting a standalone cause of action for freedom of movement, and the court found the claim duplicative of the First Amendment and wrongful-arrest claims challenging the curfew and related arrests.

Eighth cause of action—failure to intervene. The court DENIED the motion to dismiss. Whether the defendant officers had an opportunity to intervene depended on facts that required further development, and the court found the qualified-immunity argument premature.

Ninth cause of action—conspiracy. The court found the conspiracy allegations too vague and conclusory because they did not specifically describe each defendant’s role or an agreement to violate constitutional rights. The court GRANTED the motion to dismiss this claim, without prejudice to reasserting it with more facts if discovery revealed that the claim was viable.

Tenth and eleventh causes of action—disability discrimination. The court DENIED the motion to dismiss the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. The claim chart limited these claims to Cartwright against the City of San Jose. The complaint alleged that Cartwright had a brain injury and knee injuries and was physically unable to run away from officers using impact munitions. The court held that whether reasonable accommodation was possible was a factual question that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Twelfth through sixteenth causes of action—California claims. The court DENIED the motion to dismiss the California Bane Act claim, Ralph Act claim, assault-and-battery claim, false-arrest claim, and negligence claim. The defendants had relied mainly on their arguments concerning the related federal claims, and the court rejected dismissal for the same reasons it allowed those federal theories to proceed. The court also declined to resolve the defendants’ state-law discretionary-act-immunity argument at this stage, finding it better suited to summary judgment.

Disposition and claims remaining

The court’s overall disposition was that defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The first and second causes of action, for injunctive and declaratory relief, were not at issue on this motion. The claims remaining included the First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination claim; the curfew-related First Amendment claim against Sykes, Liccardo, Garcia, and the City of San Jose; excessive force; wrongful arrest; failure to intervene; the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; the Bane Act; the Ralph Act; assault and battery; false arrest; and negligence. Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton rescheduled the case-management conference for October 21, 2021.