Sepehry-Fard v. Lee

Background

Fareed Sepehry-Fard, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a Second Amended Complaint against Santa Clara County Sheriff Laurie Smith, Deputies H. Lee and Michael McRoberts, Deputy Hakeem Lee, and other defendants. The court had previously allowed only claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising under the Fourth Amendment to proceed against the County Defendants. The court had also dismissed the Bank Defendants from the case without leave to amend.

Sepehry-Fard alleged that, on February 20, 2020, McRoberts and H. Lee approached him at the Sheriff’s Office, seized his phone, stopped him from recording, twisted his arms, handcuffed him, and detained him. He alleged that H. Lee tied his left hand to a chair with severe force, that the deputies ignored his requests to take prescribed medication, and that McRoberts searched his wallet. He alleged that he was released less than an hour later and went to an emergency hospital because of pain and suffering. He also alleged that Sheriff Smith failed to train or supervise the deputies.

Rulings on the Claims

The court applied the rule requiring a complaint to include enough factual matter to state a plausible legal claim. It also recognized that complaints filed without a lawyer receive a less demanding reading, but explained that the court could not add essential facts that the complaint did not provide.

The first, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action were not claims under § 1983 arising under the Fourth Amendment. They asserted, among other things, violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, familial deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and violations of the Eighth Amendment and California Constitution. Because the earlier order limited amendment to specified Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983, the court dismissed these causes of action.

The second cause of action alleged excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. The court dismissed that claim as to Smith because the complaint did not allege that she personally participated in the incident, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or caused the alleged constitutional violation through a sufficiently described supervisory action. The court did not dismiss this claim as to McRoberts and H. Lee on the arguments presented in the motion.

The third cause of action alleged denial of medical care under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. The court dismissed it as to Smith because the complaint did not allege her involvement in McRoberts and H. Lee’s alleged failure to provide medical treatment. The court did not dismiss this claim as to McRoberts and H. Lee on the arguments presented.

The fifth cause of action alleged municipal-policy liability, commonly called Monell liability, against Smith. The court held that the claim improperly attempted to impose this type of liability on Smith individually and that the allegations about policies, supervision, training, and excessive force were too conclusory. The court dismissed the fifth cause of action.

The twelfth cause of action alleged that Smith failed to train McRoberts and H. Lee. The court dismissed it because the complaint did not identify what training practice caused the injuries or allege facts showing that Smith was responsible for the failure to train.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. It stated that, because this was Sepehry-Fard’s third attempt to plead viable causes of action and the earlier deficiencies had not been cured, the dismissals were with prejudice. Smith was dismissed from the action.

The conclusion states that Sepehry-Fard’s second, third, and fourth causes of action may proceed against McRoberts and H. Lee. That statement conflicts with the earlier section expressly dismissing the fourth cause of action along with the first, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action. The opinion does not explain or resolve this apparent inconsistency.

The court also DENIED Sepehry-Fard’s motion to strike portions of the dismissal motion based on the Thirteenth Amendment. It TERMINATED his administrative motion for permission to file a response because he was allowed to file an opposition under the court’s local rules. The case-management conference was continued to March 17, 2022.