Cupp v. Smith

Background

The case concerns Andrew Smith’s February 15, 2019 warrantless inspection of Ronald Cupp’s property. Cupp alleged that Smith entered through a gap in a wooden fence, entered the garage, walked through the carport, and photographed the property without Cupp’s or Federal National Mortgage Association’s consent. Smith was investigating a complaint about possible unpermitted construction and left citations for Cupp.

The remaining claims were a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a California trespass claim. Smith moved for summary judgment on both claims.

Fourth Amendment claim

The court denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. Smith argued that Cupp had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the garage was outside the home’s curtilage, meaning the area immediately associated with and protected like the home itself. The court applied the factors concerning the garage’s distance from the residence, whether it was enclosed with the residence, how it was used, and the steps taken to shield it from observation.

The court found factual disputes about whether the garage and residence were enclosed together and whether the garage was being used as a living space or workshop. The garage’s close proximity to the residence, its enclosure by a tall wooden fence, and the measures taken to protect it from observation also weighed against summary judgment for Smith.

The court rejected Smith’s arguments based on the open-fields doctrine and the knock-and-talk exception at the summary-judgment stage. The open-fields doctrine could not apply if the garage was within the home’s curtilage. The court also concluded that entering through a gap not available to the public, entering the garage, walking through the carport, and taking multiple photographs could have exceeded any implied permission to approach the property. The court stated that these factual issues must be resolved by a jury before Smith’s defenses can be applied; it did not find that Cupp had already prevailed on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity

The court denied Smith’s alternative request for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect an individual government official from damages unless the evidence shows a constitutional violation and the violated right was clearly established at the time. Because factual disputes remained about whether Smith violated Cupp’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court concluded that summary judgment on this defense was not proper.

California trespass claim

The court granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on Cupp’s California trespass claim. California Government Code § 910 required Cupp to present a written claim to the government within six months, describing the date, place, and circumstances of the event. The court held that Cupp’s February 20, 2019 letter stated only a conditional intent to file a claim and did not constitute a valid presented claim. Cupp later presented his claim on October 23, 2019, after the deadline had expired.

The court rejected Cupp’s argument that Smith waived this defense under California Government Code § 911. Because the February 20 letter was not a claim under § 910, the court held that the waiver provision did not apply. The court did not reach Smith’s other defenses to the trespass claim.

Punitive damages and disposition

The court denied Smith’s motion for summary judgment on Cupp’s punitive-damages claim. Viewing the evidence in Cupp’s favor, the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find callous indifference based on Smith’s failure to obtain a warrant, entry onto the property and into the garage, search of the carport, and photographs.

The court’s conclusion was that it granted Smith’s motion for summary judgment on the state-law trespass claim and denied the motion on the Fourth Amendment claim. It also sustained Cupp’s objection to paragraph 8 of Smith’s declaration because that paragraph called for a legal conclusion. The matter was re-referred to Magistrate Judge Westmore for a settlement conference within 120 days, or as soon afterward as her calendar permitted. If the case did not settle, the court stated that it would hold a case-management conference to schedule trial.