Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation

Background

Ariana Huemer founded and led Eeyore’s Hen Harbor, an organization that rescues, rehabilitates, and houses abused and neglected chickens and other birds. The Santa Cruz Animal Shelter Foundation, identified in the opinion as an agency of Santa Cruz County, investigated suspected animal-welfare violations at Hen Harbor. After obtaining search warrants supported by probable-cause affidavits, shelter employees seized 240 fowl, two goats, and other items on September 21, 2020, and 80 birds on October 2, 2020. After post-seizure hearings, an officer ordered the animals returned as soon as practicable. The defendants acknowledged that some birds died and that dozens were not returned.

The remaining claims were an unreasonable-seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment against the individual defendants, a California Bane Act claim against all defendants, and a conversion claim against all defendants. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment.

Defendants’ Motion

Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiffs’ remaining argument was that the September and October warrants were overbroad because they authorized seizure of “all animals (alive or dead),” including healthy animals. The court held that a warrant’s scope must be tied to the probable cause supporting it. The affidavits described reports of sick and dead chickens, overcrowding, inadequate food conditions, rats, and damaged coops. Because the animal-welfare statutes under investigation covered a broad range of mistreatment and did not turn on whether an animal was healthy or sick, the court held that the warrants were sufficiently connected to probable cause and were not overbroad.

The court also held that the three individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, which generally protects government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violated a clearly established right. A neutral judge had issued the warrants, and the court found no basis for the narrow exception covering warrants that no reasonable officer could believe were valid. The court therefore granted the individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. It did not decide the defendants’ alternative argument that the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating the October search’s legality because of an earlier state administrative hearing.

Bane Act claim. The California Bane Act requires intentional interference, or attempted interference, with a constitutional or legal right through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court noted that the plaintiffs conceded there was no evidence of a threat. It also found that the plaintiffs offered insufficient evidence to support an inference of intimidation or coercion. In addition, the plaintiffs did not identify an action they took, or were prevented from taking, because of the defendants’ alleged conduct. The court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Bane Act claim.

Conversion claim. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of control over someone else’s personal property. The defendants admitted that at least 318 birds were seized and that at least 267 were returned; the court stated that it therefore appeared that at least 51 birds were not returned, although the opinion also referred to different total figures in discussing the record. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the plaintiffs had the right to possess the birds. It also explained that conversion under California law does not require bad faith, knowledge, or negligence; it requires an intentional act that deprives a person of rightful possession. The defendants’ initial seizure could have been temporary and authorized by warrant, but that did not entitle them to summary judgment when dozens of animals were allegedly never returned. The court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of the conversion claim.

Immunity. The individual defendants and the Shelter were immune from state-law claims based on obtaining and executing the search warrants. The court held, however, that the defendants had not identified authority immunizing post-seizure conduct, and the conversion claim could arise from that later conduct. The court also rejected the Shelter’s argument that it could not face conversion liability because the complaint did not expressly cite California Government Code section 815.2. The complaint alleged that the individual defendants committed conversion while acting within the scope of their employment, which was sufficient to put vicarious liability at issue. The Shelter was therefore not entitled to summary judgment on the conversion claim.

Damages claims. The court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim for animal-related emotional-distress damages because the conversion claim remained viable. The court also denied the individual defendants’ motion concerning punitive damages. Although punitive damages would require clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice, the court found a fact dispute concerning whether the defendants acted with the required state of mind in failing to return or account for all the seized animals.

Plaintiffs’ Motion

Plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on whether the September and October warrants were invalid and whether the seizures were unlawful. The court rejected the arguments based on an alleged absence of probable-cause affidavits because Plaintiffs had conceded that affidavits accompanied both applications. It also rejected the overbreadth argument. The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety.

Disposition

Judge Susan Van Keulen ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted as to the Fourth Amendment and Bane Act claims and denied as to the conversion claim, emotional-distress damages, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment was denied in its entirety.