AGG v. City of Hayward

Background

The case arose from the fatal shooting of Agustin Gonsalez by Hayward Police Department officers on November 15, 2018. The plaintiffs were Gonsalez’s minor children, AGG and ARG, represented through guardian ad litem Jessica Aquino, and his parents, Agustin Gonsalez, Jr., and Karla Gonsalez. They sued the City of Hayward, Phillip Wooley, Michael Clark, and Tasha DeCosta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law.

The remaining claims included wrongful death and familial-relationship civil-rights claims under § 1983; a claim against the City under Monell, which allows municipal liability for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or practice; and California claims for negligence, battery, and violation of the Bane Act.

The officers responded to a report of a man with a knife threatening people. Wooley testified that Gonsalez approached him with his hands near waist level, that he saw a glint of something metallic, and that Gonsalez did not comply with orders to stop and drop the knife. Clark testified that Gonsalez was walking deliberately toward Wooley with his hands together and that Clark perceived an immediate threat. Wooley fired nine shots, and Clark fired three.

Other testimony differed. Christina Rodrigues testified that Gonsalez held a razor blade to his own arm, was not running or walking aggressively, and had stopped before the officers shot him. Plaintiffs also pointed to evidence that the officers did not clearly see a knife, that Wooley could have moved away, that less-lethal options were available, and that two shots were fired after Gonsalez was on the ground.

Excessive Force and Officer Liability

The court held that whether Wooley and Clark’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment presented a genuine factual dispute. A reasonable jury could find that Gonsalez was not immediately threatening the officers or others, that the officers had not verified that he had a weapon, that he was not running, and that Wooley could have created more distance or considered less-lethal options. The court also held that a jury could consider Gonsalez’s apparent emotional disturbance and whether the officers reassessed the threat during the twelve shots.

Because the evidence could support a constitutional violation, the court concluded that qualified immunity—a protection from damages unless an official violated a clearly established right—could not be granted to Wooley and Clark on summary judgment. The court determined that existing Ninth Circuit authority provided notice that deadly force could be unlawful when a person appeared to have a weapon but was not clearly threatening to use it.

DeCosta did not shoot Gonsalez. The court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims against her to the extent they relied on an integral-participant theory because the evidence did not show that she participated in Wooley and Clark’s decision to shoot. But the court denied summary judgment on the theories that DeCosta failed to intervene or supervise. A jury could find that she had time and an opportunity to intervene and that she should have known her failure to take control could allow a constitutional injury. The court also held that qualified immunity for DeCosta could not be determined on summary judgment because of these factual disputes.

Municipal Liability

The court denied summary judgment on the Monell claim based on the alleged practice of training officers to establish a predetermined “line in the sand” at which they would use deadly force. The court found that such a practice could be a moving force behind a constitutional violation. Although plaintiffs lacked evidence of a widespread training failure, the court held that a jury could find that Toney Chaplin, identified as the final decisionmaker on Wooley’s discipline, knew about Wooley’s predetermined approach and ratified it when Wooley was exonerated.

The court granted summary judgment on the Monell theory that the City’s investigatory board failed to follow City policy. The court stated that this theory improperly treated Monell as imposing liability for failing to follow a policy, rather than for executing an official policy that caused a constitutional injury.

California Claims

The court denied summary judgment on the negligence claim against Wooley and Clark because a jury could find that their use of deadly force and their conduct before the shooting breached their duty to act reasonably. The negligence claim against DeCosta could proceed based on her alleged duty to intervene, but summary judgment was granted insofar as the claim relied on duties she held as a supervisor.

The court denied summary judgment on the battery claim. It applied the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard to the officers’ use of force and relied on its earlier conclusion that a jury could find the shooting unreasonable.

The court also denied summary judgment on the Bane Act claim. The Bane Act requires a civil-rights violation involving threats, intimidation, or coercion and an officer’s specific intent to violate the right, which may be shown by reckless disregard. The court held that a jury could infer reckless disregard from the circumstances of the shooting, including the number of shots, shots fired after Gonsalez fell, and Wooley’s predetermined-distance approach.

Disposition

Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted on the § 1983 claims against DeCosta insofar as they relied on integral participation; on DeCosta’s negligence claim insofar as it relied on her supervisory duties; and on the Monell claim insofar as it relied on the investigatory board’s alleged failure to follow City policy. The motion was otherwise denied. The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for judgment under Rule 56(f) and declined to establish particular facts under Rule 56(g).