Hernandez v. Contra Costa County

Nature of the order

The court issued proposed final jury instructions for use at the end of the case. The instructions were not a verdict and did not decide whether either party was entitled to judgment. The court stated that it intended to give the instructions subject to modifications based on the evidence and developments at trial. The parties were directed to be prepared to discuss objections at the final pretrial conference on March 4, 2022.

Except where otherwise indicated, the parties had stipulated to the instructions. The court modified some proposed instructions and identified others for further discussion or possible revision.

Claims and governing framework

The instructions state that Ricardo Hernandez brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute that allows a person to seek relief when someone acting under state law deprives that person of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law. The parties stipulated that Officer Brandon Hodges acted under color of state law, meaning that he acted or appeared to act while performing official duties under state, county, or municipal law.

To prevail, Hernandez would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence—that the claim was more likely true than not—that Hodges’s acts or omissions deprived Hernandez of particular constitutional rights. The instructions also address causation and state that the jury would need to consider Hodges’s individual conduct in deciding whether he caused Hernandez’s claimed injuries. The court noted that it was not clear whether a separate causation instruction was necessary and expressed concern that some proposed causation language came from instructions for different types of § 1983 claims.

Excessive-force and participation theories

The proposed instructions address a Fourth Amendment claim based on unreasonable seizure and excessive force. They state that the jury would first need to find that one or more Contra Costa County sheriff’s deputies used excessive force against Hernandez. The jury would evaluate whether the force was objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, without using hindsight. The listed considerations include the circumstances known to the officers, any immediate threat, the amount and type of force, available alternatives, warnings, mistaken facts, and whether probable cause existed for an officer to believe Hernandez had committed a crime involving serious physical harm.

The parties agreed that there was probable cause to detain or arrest Hernandez and that the officers had reasonable cause or suspicion to detain him or probable cause to arrest him. The proposed instructions therefore state that the lawfulness of the detention or arrest was not for the jury to decide. The jury would instead consider whether excessive force was used.

The instructions describe two theories for holding Hodges responsible for the deputies’ alleged force. Under the “integral participant” theory, Hernandez would have to prove that a deputy used excessive force, Hodges performed a function necessary to complete that force, Hodges knew the excessive force would occur, and Hernandez suffered damages because of Hodges’s function. Under the failure-to-intervene theory, Hernandez would have to prove that a deputy used excessive force, Hodges had a duty to intervene, knew intervention was needed, had a reasonable and realistic opportunity to intervene, and failed to do so. The instructions state that Hodges would be entitled to a defense verdict if Hernandez failed to prove any required element, even if the deputies had used excessive force.

Damages and jury procedures

If the jury found for Hernandez on a claim, the proposed damages instruction would require him to prove damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Compensatory damages would be the amount reasonably and fairly related to injuries caused by Hodges, including the nature and extent of the injuries and physical and emotional pain and suffering. Hodges would bear the burden of proving any failure to mitigate damages and the amount that could have been avoided or reduced.

The jury could, but would not have to, award punitive damages if it found that Hodges’s conduct was malicious, oppressive, or recklessly indifferent to Hernandez’s rights. The court removed language about Hodges’s financial condition from the parties’ proposed instruction, explaining that the case involved no state-law claims and that the parties had cited no federal authority supporting use of California’s punitive-damages rule in this federal § 1983 action.

The remaining proposed instructions address the jury’s duty to follow the law, weigh only admitted evidence, deliberate toward a unanimous verdict, communicate with the court only through a signed written note from the foreperson, and avoid outside communications, media, research, or investigation. The court also identified some instructions as possibly unnecessary or subject to decision after the evidence was presented.

Disposition

Judge Alex Tse ordered that the proposed instructions be issued, subject to later modifications. The opinion does not report a verdict, judgment, or merits decision on Hernandez’s claims.