Brown v. Miller

Background

Alice Brown sued Crescent City and several employees after Officer Ethan Miller stopped her during the early morning of January 1, 2018. The parties agreed that the only claim remaining for trial was a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Miller violated the Fourth Amendment by making an unlawful traffic stop. The court had previously granted Miller summary judgment on Brown’s separate racial-profiling claim.

The order set jury selection for February 21, 2023, and anticipated a trial lasting no later than the following day. Brown and Miller were the only permitted witnesses. The three listed exhibits—Miller’s body-camera footage, Brown’s driver’s license, and the traffic incident report—were deemed admissible because neither side objected.

Motions in Limine

A motion in limine is a request to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury.

Motion No. 1: Noneconomic damages

Miller asked the court to exclude evidence or argument about Brown’s noneconomic damages, such as emotional pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. He argued that Brown had previously disclosed only the cost of a dash camera and punitive damages.

The court denied the motion. Brown could testify about general damages, including qualitative descriptions of emotional distress, but the court imposed limits because of uncertainty and delay in her disclosures:

- She could claim general damages, but not special damages such as post-traumatic stress disorder or another diagnosed mental injury. - She could not ask the jury to award a specific amount of noneconomic damages because she had not previously disclosed a calculation. - Her testimony about noneconomic harm had to concern her experience on the morning of the stop, not other incidents involving City police. - She could explain whether her subjective experience was informed by being a Black woman or by her knowledge of other incidents involving Black people being stopped by police, if those matters were actually on her mind at the time. General testimony about the Black Lives Matter movement would not be permitted.

The court also allowed Miller to take a short deposition of Brown about the claimed noneconomic damages.

Motion No. 2: Race-related evidence

Miller asked the court to exclude evidence or argument about Brown’s race as a factor in the stop, as well as evidence concerning the Black Lives Matter movement, racial protests, or police misconduct outside this case.

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion. Brown could testify about how her status as a Black woman informed her subjective experience and the humiliation or suffering she claims resulted from the stop. But the trial could not become a broader inquiry into the Black Lives Matter movement, racial protests, or unrelated police misconduct. The court planned to instruct the jury that Brown was not asserting a racial-profiling or race-discrimination claim against Miller and that this evidence was relevant only to her claimed pain and suffering from the stop.

Motion No. 3: Other traffic stops

Miller sought to exclude evidence about other questionable traffic stops, including a stop involving William Paul. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion.

Paul could not testify about his own encounter with Miller. The court concluded that Brown’s late request to add Paul as a witness should not be allowed and that his testimony would generally constitute evidence of another alleged act offered to suggest Miller’s character or habit. The court also found that the information provided did not establish a pattern sufficient to support habit evidence.

However, the court allowed Brown’s counsel to ask Miller during cross-examination whether he told Paul, “That’s what we do out here at night. We pull everybody over.” The court considered that statement potentially relevant to Miller’s truthfulness and to Brown’s contention that Miller lied about observing a traffic violation. If Miller denied making the statement, Paul could not testify to contradict him because that would be outside evidence offered to attack his credibility. The court overruled Miller’s objection based on the risk of unfair prejudice, provided that questioning was not extensive.

Other trial matters and disposition

The court accepted the parties’ proposed preliminary statement describing Miller’s position that Brown veered off the road and drove below the speed limit, and Brown’s position that she drove lawfully and gave Miller no valid reason to stop her. The court said jury instructions would be addressed in a separate order and required the parties to confer about a general verdict form.

This was a pretrial and evidence-management order. It did not decide whether Miller unlawfully stopped Brown or otherwise resolve the remaining § 1983 claim.