Pierce v. East Bay Municipal Utility District

Background

The court issued pretrial rulings on the parties’ motions in limine, which are requests to decide in advance what evidence or testimony may be presented at trial. The caption names Saji Pierce and other plaintiffs, and East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) and other defendants. The opinion discusses discrimination and retaliation allegations involving Pierce, Ayriel Bland, and Craig Spencer.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

- Motion in limine 1: The court denied Saji Pierce’s motion to exclude all evidence of her reproductive health. The defendants said they intended to make only limited use of the evidence, and the court found it could be relevant to Pierce’s request for emotional-distress damages. The court was not persuaded that the evidence’s value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, delay, or confusion. The court also rejected Pierce’s argument that the defendants improperly obtained her medical records, noting that they subpoenaed Kaiser and that Pierce did not ask the court to quash the subpoena. The court also found no breach of the parties’ agreement concerning medical records.

- Motion in limine 2: The court denied as moot the plaintiffs’ motion to prevent Dr. Minkin from testifying because the defendants agreed not to call Dr. Minkin as a witness.

- Motion in limine 3: The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to exclude all references, evidence, questions, or testimony about their involvement with publicity concerning the case. The court stated that statements made to news media could be used to impeach, or challenge the credibility of, trial statements that were inconsistent with them.

- Motion in limine 4: The court denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Doug Linney and John Coleman from testifying. The defendants did not then intend to call either witness. The court stated that the plaintiffs could renew the motion if the defendants changed course.

- Motion in limine 5: The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to exclude all references to Ayriel Bland’s income and compensation after September 20, 2021, and all references to Pierce’s husband’s income or compensation. Bland had admitted that she fully mitigated her economic damages after that date. The court found Pierce’s husband’s income or compensation irrelevant, or, to the extent relevant, substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

Defendants’ Motions

- Motion in limine 1: The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ first motion. If Pierce intended to testify that Craig Spencer treated her and other attorneys of color differently from white employees as early as 2015, the court would permit that testimony under a continuing-violation theory.

The court would also permit testimony about EBMUD’s 2018 decision not to hire Bland as support for Pierce’s retaliation claim. But Bland could not seek damages based on that discrete failure-to-hire event. The court ruled that Pierce’s retaliation claim was timely and based on her internal complaints about EBMUD’s decision not to hire Bland, while Bland’s failure-to-hire claims were time barred.

The court rejected Bland’s argument that a four-year limitations period made her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 timely. The court stated that § 1983 claims use California’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions. It also stated that, even if Bland had brought a failure-to-hire claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the four-year period would not apply to that claim. The court further found that Bland had not shown that equitable tolling applied because she did not raise it in her opposition and had not provided facts showing due diligence in uncovering the facts underlying her claims.

- Motion in limine 2: The court denied the defendants’ motion to exclude Craig Spencer’s statements to EBMUD’s internal investigator. The defendants did not persuade the court that the statements were protected by California Civil Code section 47(b)(3). The court was not convinced that EBMUD’s internal investigation was an “official proceeding” under that provision, even though EBMUD is a publicly owned utility company.

- Motion in limine 3: The court denied the defendants’ motion to exclude all evidence of investigator Zaneta Seidel’s finding of “unconscious bias.” Seidel had investigated Bland’s allegations that Spencer treated her less favorably than Anna Gunderson and concluded that Spencer had been less attentive to Bland and that unconscious racial bias was a motivating factor. The court allowed the report and testimony about it to be offered as evidence. The defendants could argue to the jury that unconscious bias is not the same as intentional discrimination, but they could not selectively remove that finding from the report.

- Motion in limine 4: The court partially granted the defendants’ motion to exclude testimony from D. Jan Duffy, the plaintiffs’ expert on management or human-resources practices. Duffy could testify about whether EBMUD adequately investigated and responded to Pierce’s and Bland’s internal complaints. Duffy could not testify about whether EBMUD’s policies and practices were generally adequate to prevent and correct discrimination and retaliation. The court found the broader testimony had limited relevance and could confuse or mislead the jury, cause undue delay, and distract from how the defendants treated Pierce and Bland.

- Motion in limine 5: The court granted the defendants’ motion to bifurcate, or separate, the punitive-damages phase of trial. The jury would first concentrate on liability without being influenced by evidence of the defendants’ wealth, which the court found irrelevant to the underlying causes of action.

Disposition and Scope

The court issued the specific evidentiary and trial-management rulings above. It did not decide the ultimate merits of the discrimination or retaliation claims. The order granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ first motion in limine; denied, denied as moot, or denied without prejudice the specified plaintiffs’ motions; granted the plaintiffs’ income-evidence motion; denied the defendants’ motions concerning Spencer’s investigator statements and Seidel’s finding; partially granted the motion concerning Duffy’s testimony; and granted the motion to separate the punitive-damages phase.