Armstead v. County of Alameda

Background

The plaintiffs were Miles Armstead’s wife and minor daughter. They sued the County of Alameda and the City of Oakland over the events leading to Miles Armstead’s death. The opinion says that Jamal Thomas, who had been the Armsteads’ neighbor, began harassing the family after he and his family were evicted. The alleged conduct included banging on the front door, yelling, throwing rocks through windows, threatening to burn the house, and breaking the windows fourteen times.

The Armsteads allegedly called the Oakland Police Department for help about twenty times. The plaintiffs alleged that officers told them, within Thomas’s earshot, that their calls were not high priorities and that the officers would not take action. They also alleged that a County probation officer brushed off their concerns and told Thomas that his conduct was not a probation violation. Thomas was arrested on February 26, 2020, and released two days later without the notice the plaintiffs had requested under Marsy’s Law. On May 1, 2020, Thomas killed Miles Armstead while he was doing yard work.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute; negligence and wrongful death; negligent hiring and supervision; California’s Marsy’s Law; and California’s Bane Act. The City moved to dismiss all claims, and the County moved to dismiss the Marsy’s Law claim.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss. At that stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly show an entitlement to relief. The court does not decide the ultimate facts or resolve factual disputes.

Marsy’s Law. The plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal of this claim. The court held that Marsy’s Law does not create a private damages claim against the state, a political subdivision, or their officials and employees. It dismissed the claim with prejudice.

Equal protection. The plaintiffs alleged that the City administered police services in a discriminatory manner. The court held that the bare allegations of discrimination did not state an equal-protection claim. It dismissed the claim without prejudice and allowed amendment.

Due process and state-created danger. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a state-created danger. Under that doctrine, government officials may face liability when their affirmative actions create or worsen a particular danger, the resulting injury is foreseeable, and the officials deliberately disregard the known danger. The court found that the alleged police statements and repeated failures to intervene, made during an escalating pattern of harassment and violence and sometimes within Thomas’s earshot, plausibly worsened the danger. The alleged escalation from threats and property damage to physical injury and murder also plausibly supported foreseeability. The court said causation was a factual issue that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

The court nevertheless dismissed the § 1983 due-process claim without prejudice because the claim was brought against the City rather than an individual officer. Under the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if a policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. The plaintiffs alleged that officers were overextended and could not prioritize their calls, but they did not specifically allege that this was a standard City policy or practice. The court dismissed the claim with leave to amend.

Negligence. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly pleaded negligence. Under California law, affirmative acts by police officers that increase the risk of harm can create a special relationship and a duty to the person placed at risk. The alleged continued inaction and statements that the police would do nothing plausibly increased the danger to Miles Armstead.

The court rejected the City’s argument that California Government Code sections 845 and 846 immunized it from liability. The court distinguished protected decisions about police policies, resources, arrests, and custody from the alleged negligence theory based on a state-created danger. It held that the City was not immune from the negligence claim at this stage.

Bane Act. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly pleaded a claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act. The Act addresses interference, or attempted interference, with rights under the United States Constitution or federal law through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court explained that the required coercion need not be separate from the alleged constitutional violation. It concluded that allegations of deliberate indifference—conscious or reckless disregard of the escalating danger—plausibly supplied the specific intent required for the Bane Act claim. The court denied the City’s motion to dismiss that claim.

Disposition

The court dismissed the Marsy’s Law claim with prejudice. It dismissed the due-process, equal-protection, and negligent-hiring-and-supervision claims without prejudice. It otherwise denied the City’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs could file an amended complaint within 35 days and were required to attach a comparison showing changes from the current complaint. The order disposed of ECF Nos. 25 and 26.