M.P. v. Kijakazi

Background

M.P. applied for Title II disability benefits, alleging disability beginning December 12, 2018. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that M.P. was not disabled. The ALJ identified coronary artery disease and a right-shoulder condition involving impingement syndrome, a rotator-cuff tear, and tendinitis as severe impairments. The ALJ determined that M.P. could perform work with specified lifting, standing, walking, stooping, climbing, and right-arm reaching limits, and concluded that M.P. could perform past relevant work as a unit clerk.

After the Social Security Appeals Council denied review, M.P. filed this action. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standards.

Medical Opinions

The court held that the ALJ erred in evaluating the residual functional capacity (RFC) opinions of treating physician Dr. Sackett and state-agency consulting physician Dr. Rudito. Under the regulations applicable to this claim, the ALJ had to evaluate medical opinions for persuasiveness, expressly addressing supportability and consistency. Supportability concerns the medical evidence and explanation supporting an opinion; consistency concerns how well the opinion fits the other evidence.

The ALJ found Dr. Sackett’s RFC opinion less persuasive because of alleged inconsistencies with her records and with the longitudinal medical evidence. The court disagreed. It found that Dr. Sackett’s differing assessments reflected fluctuations in M.P.’s shoulder symptoms that corresponded to changes in work activity. The court also found that Dr. Sackett’s restrictions were consistent with the opinions of other treating providers, including Dr. Siqueiros, Dr. Navani, and Nurse Practitioner Kwan. The court concluded that the ALJ selectively relied on records concerning other medical issues and isolated periods of improvement instead of considering the shoulder condition as a whole.

The court further found that Dr. Rudito’s opinion contained little explanation for rejecting more restrictive limitations. The court concluded that Dr. Rudito’s assessment was no more supportable or consistent with the record than Dr. Sackett’s opinion. Because the opinions were at least equally supported and consistent, the ALJ was required to consider additional regulatory factors, including the treatment relationship, specialization, and other relevant factors.

Daughter’s Testimony

M.P.’s daughter, P.P., submitted a third-party function report describing the effect of M.P.’s impairments on work, lifting, concentration, reaching, sitting, climbing stairs, and hand use. The ALJ stated that the report had been fully considered but did not discuss it in detail.

The court did not decide whether the newer regulations still required an ALJ to give specific reasons for rejecting nonmedical-source testimony. It held that any error was harmless because P.P.’s statements largely repeated M.P.’s own testimony, and the ALJ had given reasons for discounting M.P.’s testimony. Those reasons included inconsistencies between M.P.’s testimony and the medical evidence, particularly concerning cardiac impairments. The court therefore found that the ALJ did not err in handling P.P.’s testimony.

Constitutional Challenge

M.P. argued that she was entitled to a new hearing before a new ALJ because the Commissioner’s appointment authority was affected by an unconstitutional removal restriction. The court agreed that 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3), to the extent it limited the President’s ability to remove the Commissioner without cause, violated separation-of-powers principles.

The court nevertheless rejected M.P.’s request for relief on this ground. It held that the removal restriction was severable, did not automatically invalidate the Commissioner’s actions, and did not itself establish harm. The court also found no link between the removal restriction and the denial of M.P.’s claim. The constitutional issue therefore did not provide a basis for a new hearing.

Disposition

The court concluded that further administrative proceedings were appropriate because it was not clear that M.P. would necessarily be found disabled if the evidence were properly evaluated. It ordered the ALJ to reconsider Dr. Sackett’s and Dr. Rudito’s RFC opinions using the additional regulatory factors and the guidance in the opinion. The request for remand to a different ALJ was denied.

The court granted in part and denied in part M.P.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.