G. v. City of Lafayette

Background

The case arose from a May 6, 2020 incident that began at a store in Lafayette, California. The plaintiffs alleged that store employees misidentified them as four Black male armed robbers and called the Lafayette police. As James Larry Benton, Sr. drove the plaintiffs away from the store, two police cars followed him.

The complaint alleged that one car, allegedly driven by officer Kevin White, swerved around Benton’s car, drove close to its bumper, flashed a bright spotlight into the vehicle, and boxed the car in while Benton was driving about 65 miles per hour. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers did not activate their lights or sirens or direct Benton to stop. They further alleged that White laughed when Benton asked whether he should pull over and that the officers continued the pursuit even though they could see the plaintiffs did not match the description provided by the store.

The plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint asserted federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally plausible claim.

California Government Claims Act

The defendants argued that the minor plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Contra Costa County and White were barred because the plaintiffs had not complied with California’s Government Claims Act. That law generally requires a claimant to present a claim to a public entity before filing a lawsuit for money or damages.

The court rejected the argument. The minor plaintiffs had presented claims to the County on March 23, 2021, and the County rejected them as untimely on April 2, 2021. The plaintiffs then sought permission to file a late claim and filed this lawsuit on May 11, 2021, while that application was pending. The court distinguished a case involving a plaintiff who filed suit before presenting the underlying claim at all. It held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded compliance because their claims had already been presented and rejected before the lawsuit was filed, and because the County later denied the minor plaintiffs’ late-claim applications.

Equal Protection and Qualified Immunity

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded a § 1983 claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Such a claim requires allegations that officials intentionally treated the plaintiff differently because of membership in a protected group.

The court concluded that the allegations that officers continued dangerous conduct after realizing the plaintiffs did not match the reported description, and did so based solely on race, were enough at the pleading stage. The court also held that qualified immunity did not bar the claim. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court reasoned that police officers had long been on notice that they could not treat people differently because of race, even without a prior case involving identical facts.

Due Process and State-Created Danger

The Third Amended Complaint also asserted a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause against White and officer Neil Black. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not been authorized to add that claim. The court stated that the federal rules allow amendment of pleadings liberally and that dismissing the claim on that ground would elevate procedure over substance.

The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a substantive due-process claim under the state-created danger doctrine. That doctrine can apply when government officials affirmatively create or expose a person to a danger the person otherwise would not have faced. The court found allegations supporting the required elements: the officers’ driving and spotlight conduct allegedly created a specific danger; injuries such as severe mental anguish were allegedly foreseeable; and the officers allegedly acted with deliberate indifference to the danger. The court also held that qualified immunity did not bar this claim at this stage because Ninth Circuit law had long warned officers that they could violate due process by affirmatively placing someone in such danger.

Other Claims and Defendants

The court explained that the state-law claims under the Ralph and Bane Acts, along with negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, had survived the earlier motion to dismiss and survived again. The court read the Third Amended Complaint’s references to new claims by Benton against additional defendants as an attempt to reflect earlier rulings, not as an improper effort to add claims. It stated that Benton could assert claims only against White and the City, because his claims against Contra Costa County had previously been found barred by the statute of limitations.

The court also declined to dismiss the City of Lafayette. Although the defendants argued that the officers worked for Contra Costa County rather than the City, the court found that the complaint plausibly alleged an employment or contractual relationship involving the City and County. The court stated that the precise relationship could later lead to voluntary dismissal by the City or a motion for summary judgment.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. The order did not resolve the claims after trial or summary judgment. It also stated that Black, who had not appeared and apparently had not been served, could later file his own motion to dismiss directed to the claims against him.