Scott Crawford v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
- Richard Seeborg
- 3:17-cv-02664
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 23
In Crawford v. Uber, Judge Seeborg entered judgment for Uber after finding plaintiffs had not proved their Americans with Disabilities Act claims.
The judgment affected Scott Crawford, Stephan Namisnak, and Francis Falls, who use electric wheelchairs, and Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, Inc.; judgment was entered for the defendants.
What happened
Scott Crawford, Stephan Namisnak, and Francis Falls use electric wheelchairs and asked Uber to provide wheelchair-accessible rides in Jackson, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana. Uber did not offer that service in those cities, so the plaintiffs sued Uber Technologies and Rasier under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
After a three-day trial, the court rejected both remaining claims. It found that providing wheelchair-accessible service would be a legally recognized change to Uber’s service and would not fundamentally change Uber’s business, but the plaintiffs had not shown that their requested service was reasonable given its expected cost and limited coverage. The court also found that Uber’s vehicle rules effectively excluded many wheelchair-accessible vehicles, but the plaintiffs had not shown that those rules themselves would likely prevent wheelchair users from being matched with rides because too few accessible vehicles were operating in the cities.
Judge Seeborg entered judgment for the defendants on both claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court did not reach Uber’s motion to strike portions of an expert’s testimony, and a separate claim had already been resolved for defendants on summary judgment.
The detailed version
- Scott Crawford v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · No. 3:17-cv-02664
- Richard Seeborg
- July 25, 2022
Background
Three plaintiffs who use electric wheelchairs—Scott Crawford, Stephan Namisnak, and Francis Falls—asked Uber Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary Rasier, Inc. to provide wheelchair-accessible vehicle service, called UberWAV, in Jackson, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The plaintiffs stated under oath that they would use Uber if it offered rides accommodating electric wheelchairs. UberWAV was available in some other cities but not in Jackson or New Orleans.
The plaintiffs brought claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which governs privately operated public accommodations and certain private transportation services. They alleged that Uber failed to make a reasonable modification to its service under 42 U.S.C. § 12184(b)(2)(A), and that Uber imposed eligibility criteria that screened out people with disabilities under § 12184(b)(1). The opinion states that a third § 12184 claim had already been resolved for defendants on summary judgment, and that other claims had previously been dismissed as a matter of law.
Bench Trial and Evidence
The parties presented evidence over three days. The evidence addressed possible ways to provide UberWAV, including driver incentives, commercial fleet partnerships, vehicle-rental programs, and dispatch arrangements. The parties also presented evidence about costs and Uber’s existing accessible-vehicle programs in other cities.
Uber estimated that a commercial fleet partnership would cost about $800,000 per year in New Orleans, or approximately $400 per ride, and $550,000 per year in Jackson, or approximately $1,000 per ride. Those estimates contemplated limited service: 16 hours on weekdays and 10 hours on weekends, with three vehicles operating at a time as a minimum. The court found that the plaintiffs’ evidence about less expensive alternatives, accessibility fees, and using accessible vehicles for other types of trips did not reliably show that those approaches would work while preserving adequate service.
Reasonable-Modification Claim
The court held that the plaintiffs’ request to make UberWAV available in Jackson and New Orleans was a modification under the ADA, even though the plaintiffs did not specify one particular implementation method. The court also rejected Uber’s argument that the request would fundamentally alter its business. Uber already provided on-demand transportation and had used commercial fleet partnerships in other cities.
The court nevertheless found that the requested modification was unreasonable. The ADA requires reasonable accommodations, and reasonableness depends on the facts, including the modification’s effectiveness and its cost. The court concluded that the likely cost was too high for the limited service that would result. The proposed program would not provide the continuous availability of UberX, would have gaps in coverage, and could leave requests unfulfilled even during operating hours. The plaintiffs therefore failed to prove a violation of § 12184(b)(2)(A).
Screening-Out Claim
The plaintiffs argued that Uber’s vehicle requirements screened out wheelchair-accessible vehicles by banning vans and prohibiting aftermarket seating modifications. The court found that the ban on vans alone did not screen out most accessible vehicles because Uber’s accepted-vehicle lists included minivans. The court did find that the prohibition on aftermarket seating modifications would effectively screen out many accessible vehicles, which are often made by removing seats from minivans.
Uber argued that enforcing the vehicle requirements was necessary to maintain its insurance policies and standard passenger-seat requirements. The court found that Uber had not carried its burden of showing that it could not allow accessible vehicles modified by licensed technicians under safety standards. But the court concluded that allowing accessible vehicles on UberX would not itself guarantee accessible service. Because the evidence showed fewer than 10 accessible vehicles operating in each city, the plaintiffs had not established a likelihood that a wheelchair user would be matched with one. The court therefore found that the eligibility criteria themselves did not violate § 12184(b)(1).
Other Matters and Disposition
Uber moved to strike portions of testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. James Cooper, on the ground that the testimony exceeded his written report. The court did not reach that motion because it found the challenged opinions largely unpersuasive and unnecessary to its analysis. The opinion also states that Uber’s administrative motions to file materials under seal were granted.
Judge Richard Seeborg concluded that the plaintiffs had not presented adequate evidence that Uber violated either § 12184(b)(1) or § 12184(b)(2)(A). The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
Read the full 23-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.