Sarmiento v. Marquez

Background

Danielle Sarmiento and Michael Sanchez alleged that they were foster parents of a child placed with them by the Family and Children’s Services Division of the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department. They alleged that, while they were pursuing adoption, social worker Luz Sanclemente asked Sarmiento whether she believed in God and Jesus Christ. According to the complaint, Sarmiento objected to the questions, and the agency then decided to place the child with another family because plaintiffs did not appear to be Christians.

Plaintiffs also alleged that they filed grievances and juvenile-court petitions challenging the religious questioning and the placement decision. They asserted eight causes of action, including religious discrimination; civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; claims related to municipal liability; emotional-distress claims; a California unfair-business-practices claim; California civil-rights claims; and requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.

The first amended complaint named Ruby Marquez, Shannon Sullivan, Nancy de la Peña, Ellen M. Timberlake, Keith Bostick, Luz Sanclemente, Carol Crisman, Stephanie Vikati, and the County of Santa Cruz. Defendants Marquez, Sullivan, de la Peña, Timberlake, Crisman, Vikati, and the County moved to dismiss. During the hearing, defendants’ counsel stated that Sanclemente and Bostick had not been served and asked that they also be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not appear at the hearing, although the opinion states that counsel knew the hearing date and time and was contacted by court staff.

Rule 8 dismissal

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to provide a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The court held that plaintiffs’ first amended complaint did not meet that standard for several reasons.

First, the complaint was 42 pages long and contained 156 paragraphs, many of which the court found unintelligible or incomprehensible. The court concluded that the complaint was excessively lengthy and confusing rather than a clear statement of the claims.

Second, plaintiffs asserted every claim against every defendant without identifying what role any particular defendant allegedly played. The court noted, as examples, that plaintiffs asserted a municipal-liability claim against individual defendants and a Section 1983 claim against the County, while also failing to distinguish among the defendants’ alleged conduct.

Third, plaintiffs did not connect the factual allegations to particular causes of action. They incorporated nearly all preceding allegations into each claim without explaining which facts supported which claim or how the alleged conduct satisfied the elements of a legal violation. The court therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 8(a).

Rule 12(b)(6) request

Defendants also sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They relied on abstention doctrines, California’s anti-SLAPP statute, and other state-law privileges and immunities.

The court stated that some abstention doctrines, particularly the Younger abstention doctrine, might apply. However, because the first amended complaint was too vague and unclear, the court could not adequately evaluate defendants’ arguments. The court said it would reconsider those arguments in response to a later complaint. It therefore denied without prejudice defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Leave to amend

The court granted plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. It ordered plaintiffs, for each cause of action, to identify the right allegedly violated, name the defendant or defendants responsible, state the elements of the claim, and describe the specific conduct that allegedly satisfied those elements. Plaintiffs were given 28 days from the date of the order to file an amended complaint. The court stated that no additional parties or claims could be added without the court’s permission or defendants’ agreement, and warned that a second amended complaint that was equally confusing and excessive could be dismissed with prejudice.

Service of process

The court separately addressed Sanclemente and Bostick, whom plaintiffs had not properly served. The court had previously extended the service deadline and warned plaintiffs that failure to serve defendants could lead to dismissal. Plaintiffs did not meet the extended deadline or file additional proof of service, and plaintiffs’ counsel did not appear at the hearing.

Applying the factors governing dismissal for failure to prosecute or failure to obey court orders, the court found that all five factors favored dismissal: the public interest in resolving cases promptly, the court’s need to manage its docket, presumed prejudice to defendants, the policy favoring decisions on the merits, and the lack of success from less severe measures. The court granted defendants’ request to dismiss Sanclemente and Bostick from the action with prejudice.

Judicial notice and sealing

Defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of Exhibits A through H, which were filings from state proceedings. Judicial notice allows a court to recognize certain facts or public records that are not reasonably subject to dispute. The court granted the request because the exhibits were state-court filings and therefore judicially noticeable.

Defendants also moved to seal the exhibits. The court found a compelling reason to seal them because they concerned the placement of a minor child and California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 protects the confidentiality of child-dependency records. The court found that sealing the records in their entirety was sufficiently narrow and granted the motion to seal.

Disposition

The court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiffs’ first amended complaint with leave to amend within 28 days. It denied without prejudice the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal request, dismissed Sanclemente and Bostick with prejudice, granted the request for judicial notice, and granted the motion to seal.