Hwang v. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC
- Sallie Kim
- 3:20-cv-08551
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Hwang v. National Technology, Judge Kim granted National Technology’s motion for summary judgment on Hwang’s discrimination and retaliation claims.
Robert Hwang’s Title VII and California Fair Employment and Housing Act claims for race and national-origin discrimination and retaliation were resolved against him at summary judgment. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC obtained summary judgment.
What happened
In Hwang v. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, Robert Hwang alleged that the company discriminated against him because of his race and national origin and retaliated against him. He challenged a negative performance review, performance requirements, his retirement, and the company’s refusal to let him return to work.
The court ruled that Hwang did not provide enough evidence that the negative review, retirement, or refusal to rescind his retirement was a legally significant employment action. The court also found insufficient evidence that similarly situated employees outside his protected groups were treated better, that his retirement was forced by intolerable conditions, or that the company acted in retaliation for his discrimination complaint.
Judge Sallie Kim granted the company’s motion for summary judgment on Hwang’s federal and state discrimination and retaliation claims. The court also ruled on the company’s evidence objections as described in the order and directed the clerk to close the file; a separate judgment was to follow.
The detailed version
- Hwang v. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC · No. 3:20-cv-08551
- Sallie Kim
- Aug. 18, 2022
Background
Robert Hwang alleged that National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC discriminated against him based on race and national origin during his employment. He brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as retaliation claims under both laws.
Hwang had worked at Sandia National Laboratories since 2013, and the defendant had managed and operated the laboratory since May 2017. Before Doris Ellis became his supervisor, Hwang testified that he received raises, promotions, and above-satisfactory evaluations. Ellis later raised concerns about his attendance at management meetings, delegation of management duties, interactions with staff, and management style. Hwang disputed some of those concerns and said that he followed Ellis’s directives.
In October 2019, Hwang received a performance evaluation stating that his performance as a director did not meet expectations. He received the lowest rating available on the standard goal concerning day-to-day job requirements. In December 2019, the defendant placed him on a Performance Expectation Plan and gave him three options: complete the plan, resign without the possibility of rehire, or seek review by a corporate committee. Hwang selected the resignation option but changed the wording to announce his retirement. The defendant accepted his retirement.
Hwang later learned that, according to the opinion, termination would not have caused him to lose his retirement benefits. He then sought to return to work and submitted an action plan. The defendant rejected the request, stating that the plan was late and did not address the identified leadership deficiencies. Hwang’s counsel also sent the defendant a copy of Hwang’s charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Summary-judgment standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court may not weigh competing evidence or decide witness credibility at this stage. After the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must identify specific evidence showing a genuine issue for trial.
Employment-discrimination claims
The court granted summary judgment on Hwang’s Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act discrimination claims. To establish an initial discrimination case, Hwang had to show that he belonged to a protected group, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and was treated less favorably than similarly situated people outside his protected group.
The court held that Hwang’s low performance rating was not an adverse employment action. Although Hwang argued that the rating prevented him from receiving an approximately $30,000 bonus, the court found that he did not provide enough evidence that he was entitled to a bonus, that he met the requirements for one, or that bonuses were not discretionary.
The court also rejected Hwang’s argument that the defendant admitted terminating him. The court said the defendant’s statement that it had a legitimate reason to terminate him did not admit that it actually did so. The court further held that Hwang could not raise a constructive-discharge theory for the first time in opposition to summary judgment because he had not adequately pleaded that theory in his complaint. Constructive discharge means that working conditions became so intolerable because of discrimination that a reasonable person would have had no reasonable choice but to quit. The court alternatively found that Hwang’s evidence—including discussions about another position, the negative review, and the performance plan—was insufficient to meet that standard.
The court held that the defendant’s refusal to accept Hwang’s attempted rescission of his retirement was not an adverse employment action because the defendant had already accepted his retirement. Even assuming that the refusal could qualify as an adverse action, the court found that Hwang did not show that similarly situated people outside his protected groups were treated more favorably. The two employees he identified were not shown to have been on a performance plan, to have had their resignations accepted before seeking rescission, or to have been outside Hwang’s protected groups.
The court also rejected Hwang’s evidence of racial animus. One alleged statement about hiring people from China was based on multiple layers of statements by other people and was not admissible on the record before the court. The court found that Ellis’s statement that “the fish rots from the head” was not shown to be racially motivated and, standing alone, was insufficient to create a triable issue.
Retaliation claims
The court granted summary judgment on Hwang’s Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act retaliation claims. Hwang argued that the defendant refused to let him rescind his retirement after learning that he had filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge.
The court held that the refusal to accept the rescission was not an adverse employment action, so the retaliation claims failed. The court also stated that, even if Hwang had established an initial retaliation case, the defendant had provided a legitimate reason for rejecting his request: the action plan was late and deficient. The court found that Hwang did not rebut that explanation with evidence of intentional retaliation.
Disposition
The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. It overruled the defendant’s evidentiary objections to the extent it considered the challenged evidence, except for the objections to Rebecca Perry’s declaration discussed in the order. The court stated that a separate judgment would issue and directed the clerk to close the file.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.