Taylor v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades
- William Orrick
- 3:21-cv-08712
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 15
In Taylor v. International Union, Judge Orrick granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss Taylor’s union-related claims.
William Taylor may continue litigating Claims One, Two, and Six through Eleven under section 501 of the LMRDA. The defendants—including IUPAT and the named union officials—won dismissal of Claims Three, Four, Five, and Twelve, as well as Taylor’s claims under LMRDA section 101 and LMRA sections 301 and 302.
What happened
In Taylor v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, William Taylor, representing himself, alleged that union officials violated federal labor laws through financial, training, contract, election, and retaliation-related conduct.
The court allowed Claims One, Two, and Six through Eleven to proceed, but only under section 501 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. It dismissed Claims Three, Four, Five, and Twelve without leave to amend, and dismissed Taylor’s claims under the Act’s section 101 and the Labor Management Relations Act’s sections 301 and 302.
Judge William H. Orrick granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The case was scheduled to continue with the surviving claims.
The detailed version
- Taylor v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades · No. 3:21-cv-08712
- William Orrick
- Aug. 29, 2022
Background
William Taylor, a journeyman member of International Union of Painters and Allied Trades (IUPAT), sued IUPAT and six individual union officials. Taylor represented himself. His Second Amended Complaint asserted 12 claims under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).
Taylor alleged problems involving a union training trust, financial reporting, an audit approved by union members, training funded through an agreement with California, collective bargaining agreements, apprentice assignments, pension-fund practices, union referendums, and treatment of his speech at union meetings. The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a claim for relief.
Section 501 claims
Section 501 of the LMRDA imposes fiduciary duties on union officers and representatives, including duties concerning union money and property, compliance with governing documents, and accounting for certain profits. Section 501(b) allows a union member to sue after requesting that the union or its officials pursue appropriate relief and receiving no adequate response, but the provision also requires court permission to file suit.
The court held that Claims One and Two adequately alleged section 501 violations based on alleged failures to provide financial reports and to act on the membership-approved audit. The claims identified the alleged duties, the people who allegedly breached them, and Taylor’s requests for relief.
The court also allowed Claim Six to proceed under section 501. That claim alleged that several union officials blocked or interrupted Taylor’s speech or encouraged conduct intended to suppress members’ participation in union meetings. The court concluded that the allegations met the relatively low pleading threshold at this stage.
Claims Seven through Eleven also could proceed under section 501. Those claims concerned alleged interference with members’ rights to participate, deliberate, and vote in several union referendums. The court found that Taylor sufficiently alleged the relevant duties, the alleged conduct by Robles, Bigelow, and Williams, and requests for corrective action.
The court dismissed Claims Three, Four, Five, and Twelve under section 501 without leave to amend. Claim Three concerned collective bargaining agreement provisions allocating contributions to a training trust that Taylor alleged had been terminated. Claims Four and Five concerned alleged inaccurate training reports and apprentice assignments. Claim Twelve concerned alleged pension-fund “backfilling” and related compensation issues. The court found that Taylor had not specifically alleged that he requested that the union, its governing body, or its officers sue or obtain appropriate relief concerning those particular alleged violations.
LMRDA section 101 claims
Taylor also asserted claims under section 101 of the LMRDA, which protects union members’ equal participation, voting, speech, and assembly rights. The court considered the claims under both section 101(a)(1), which requires unequal treatment compared with other members, and section 101(a)(2), which requires protected opposition to union policies, retaliatory action, and a direct connection between the two.
The court dismissed the section 101 claims without leave to amend. Taylor’s allegations generally described harm to the membership as a whole and did not allege that he was denied rights given to other union members, as required for a section 101(a)(1) claim. As to section 101(a)(2), the court found that interruptions and shouting at a union meeting did not sufficiently allege retaliatory action, and that Taylor’s other retaliation allegations were too vague and conclusory.
LMRA section 301 claims
Claims Three, Four, and Five also invoked section 301 of the LMRA, which addresses lawsuits involving contracts between employers and labor organizations. The defendants argued that the claims could not proceed against individual union officers.
The court explained that the defendants overstated that argument: section 301 can permit suits seeking injunctive relief against individual officers, although individual officers cannot be held liable for damages in the circumstances discussed by the court. The court nevertheless dismissed the section 301 claims without leave to amend because Taylor’s requested injunctions—such as audits, rerunning referendums, notices of rights, and an injunction against retaliation—did not address the alleged collective bargaining agreement violations. Taylor also did not allege that IUPAT itself violated those agreements.
LMRA section 302 claim
The court treated Claim Five as also appearing to assert a claim under section 302 of the LMRA, which prohibits certain payments or transfers of value intended to influence union officers or employees. The court agreed that section 302 does not provide a private damages action, but explained that it can permit a private claim for injunctive relief.
The court dismissed the section 302 claim because Taylor’s requested injunctions did not address the alleged conduct underlying that claim—alleged receipt by Robles, Bigelow, and Northam of goods or other things of value from Freeman Expositions. The opinion states that the claim was dismissed because Taylor did not appear to seek the type of injunctive relief that section 302 permits.
Disposition
Judge William H. Orrick granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Claims One and Two and Claims Six through Eleven may proceed, but only under section 501 of the LMRDA. Claims Three, Four, Five, and Twelve were dismissed in their entirety without leave to amend. The court scheduled a case-management conference for September 27, 2022.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.