Sample v. Smith
- William Orrick
- 3:23-cv-00428
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
In Joseph Sample v. Matthew Smith, Judge Orrick granted in part and denied in part dismissal motions, dismissing some claims while allowing others to continue.
Joseph Sample and the defendants who filed the motions to dismiss. Sample’s § 1983 claims were dismissed with prejudice; some other claims were dismissed with leave to amend, while the race-based hostile-work-environment claim and certain claims against Hughes survived for now.
What happened
In Joseph Sample v. Matthew Smith, Joseph Sample, representing himself, alleged that coworkers and others subjected him to racial and disability-related harassment while he worked for Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC. He also alleged that a false report led to the loss of his commercial driving license and contributed to his losing his job.
The court dismissed Sample’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants were private individuals, not state actors. It also dismissed any claims against union representative Mike Hughes based on a duty to represent him, allowing Sample to amend those claims. The court allowed Sample’s hostile-work-environment race-discrimination claim to continue but dismissed his disability-discrimination claim with leave to amend. It rejected arguments that the remaining claims were preempted by labor law or too unclear to understand.
Judge Orrick’s order therefore granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss. The case was stayed at least until a scheduled case-management conference, and Sample was given an opportunity to seek counsel and file an amended complaint.
The detailed version
- Sample v. Smith · No. 3:23-cv-00428
- William Orrick
- June 28, 2023
Background
Joseph Sample, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Matthew Smith, Mike Hughes, Kim Linton, Laura Larson, James Hazen, David Holdren, Joanna Pine, Demetrius Hawkins, and others. He alleged that he worked as a driver for Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC, from 2018 to 2022 and was subjected to repeated racial and disability-related slurs and harassment. Sample also alleged that he complained to human-resources personnel, sought a transfer, and was not adequately assisted by a union representative. He claimed that a false report and letter to the Department of Motor Vehicles caused him to lose his commercial license and contributed to his losing his job. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Two groups of defendants moved to dismiss: Linton, Pine, Hawkins, and Larson, referred to as the employee defendants, and Hughes. Smith, Hazen, and Holdren had not appeared, and the opinion states that it was unclear whether they had been served.
Section 1983 claims
The court dismissed Sample’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with prejudice. Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law. The court held that Sample’s claims were asserted against private individuals and did not involve state action.
Claims concerning Hughes
Hughes argued that all claims against him were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and barred by its six-month limitations period because they were essentially claims that he failed to represent Sample properly. The court did not interpret the complaint as bringing duty-of-fair-representation claims, particularly because Sample alleged that Hughes contributed to the hostile work environment by using racial slurs. To the extent Sample intended to bring duty-of-fair-representation claims, the court dismissed them with leave to amend so he could explain why the limitations period did not apply. The court held that the remaining claims concerning Hughes’s alleged contribution to the hostile work environment survived for now.
Title VII and ADA claims
The court concluded that Sample plausibly alleged a race-based hostile work environment under Title VII. It held that the allegations of constant racial slurs, the alleged false report to the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the alleged termination based on racist views were sufficient at the pleading stage. That claim survived. The court encouraged Sample, if he amended, to address whether he had exhausted administrative remedies or remedies required by a collective bargaining agreement and to clarify the roles of the workers involved.
The court dismissed Sample’s disability-discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act with leave to amend. The allegations about his speech impediment and malrotation were likely enough to show that he had a disability, but the complaint did not clearly allege that an adverse employment action occurred because of his disabilities. As pleaded, the loss of work and firing appeared motivated by racism rather than ableism. The court directed Sample to explain, if possible, how his disabilities adversely affected his employment.
Other arguments and disposition
The employee defendants argued that any non-§ 1983 claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court denied the motion on that basis because the defendants did not explain how a statute concerning suits against unions would prevent claims against individual employees and supervisors. The court also denied the employee defendants’ request to dismiss the entire complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as unintelligible, finding that the complaint was understandable even though it was less straightforward than a complaint drafted by a lawyer.
The court stated that the motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. It stayed the case at least until the September 12, 2023 case-management conference and stated that Sample would have an opportunity to seek counsel through the court’s Legal Help Center and file an amended complaint.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.