Horton v. Cauley

Background

Cory A. Horton, who was representing himself, brought 29 claims against the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, collectively called the City, and against several current or former SFPUC employees. Horton alleged that he was assaulted near his job site in August 2020, later experienced threats and racial insults while working, developed trauma-related symptoms, requested workplace accommodations, and was medically separated from his employment on November 30, 2021.

Horton’s claims arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, the California Labor Code, the California Government Code, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and tort law. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Because Horton was representing himself, the court read his complaint liberally but still required enough factual allegations to make each claim plausible.

Claims Against Individual Defendants

Claims 1–9, 12, and 16–21 were dismissed against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court explained that Title VII and the ADA do not provide personal liability claims against individual supervisors or employees, and Horton clarified that he intended many of these claims to be asserted against the City rather than the individuals.

Title VII Claims Against the City

Claim 1, alleging a race-based hostile work environment, could proceed. Horton alleged that people called him the N-word and told him, “Murder the monkey,” while he was working, that he reported the incidents, and that nothing was done. The court found those allegations sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage under a theory that an employer may be liable for third-party harassment after learning of it and failing to investigate or remedy it.

Claim 2, alleging Title VII retaliation, was dismissed against the City with leave to amend. The court found that the alleged timing and other facts did not plausibly show that Horton’s medical separation resulted from protected complaints. The complaint also did not allege that the defendants knew about Horton’s October 2021 complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and California Department of Fair Employment and Housing.

Claim 3, alleging constructive discharge under Title VII, was dismissed with prejudice against all defendants. Constructive discharge requires an employee to resign, and Horton alleged that he was medically separated rather than that he resigned. The court reached the same conclusion for the related FEHA constructive-discharge claim, Claim 21, which was also dismissed with prejudice against all defendants.

ADA Claims

Claim 4, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA, could proceed against the City. Although the City argued that Horton’s job duties required on-site work, the complaint also alleged that some employees had worked remotely and that other requested accommodations might have allowed Horton to work on-site.

Claim 5, alleging ADA disparate treatment, was dismissed against the City with leave to amend because Horton described his protected characteristic as “national origin, black American,” rather than alleging discrimination based on a disability as required for an ADA claim.

Claim 6, alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation, could proceed against the City. The court rejected the City’s argument that Horton had not plausibly alleged that he could perform his job’s essential functions with an accommodation.

Claims 7 and 8, alleging an ADA hostile work environment, were dismissed against the City with leave to amend. The court assumed for purposes of the motion, without deciding, that this type of ADA claim could be asserted in the circuit. It found that Horton had not sufficiently alleged that the conduct occurred because of his disability or that it was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.

Claim 9, alleging ADA retaliation, was dismissed against the City with leave to amend because, like the Title VII retaliation claim, it lacked sufficient allegations connecting protected activity to the medical separation.

California Labor Code Claims

Claims 10–11, 14, and 25–26 could proceed against all defendants at this stage. The defendants’ only argument was that the cited Labor Code provisions did not create a private right to sue in court. The court rejected that argument for purposes of the motions, relying on statutory language stating that an employee “may” file an administrative complaint and on authorities indicating that administrative procedures were permitted but not exclusive.

Claim 22, a Labor Code retaliation claim, was dismissed against the City with leave to amend because the complaint did not adequately allege causation. The individual defendants were also covered by the dismissal with prejudice of Claim 22’s related claims against individuals under the court’s ruling on individual liability.

California Government Code and FEHA Claims

Claim 12, under California Government Code section 815.6, was dismissed with leave to amend against the City. The court found that Horton had not identified an enactment imposing a mandatory affirmative duty on the City. The individual defendants were dismissed from this claim with prejudice.

Claim 15, under FEHA section 12940(d), was dismissed against all defendants with leave to amend. Horton had not plausibly alleged that the parking-pass events involved a publication or non-job-related inquiry of the kind covered by that provision, or that the events disclosed his disability.

Claim 16, alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation under FEHA, could proceed against the City. Claim 17, alleging failure to engage in a timely, good-faith interactive process, could also proceed against the City. The court found Horton’s allegations that the process was abusive, noninteractive, and conducted in bad faith sufficient at the pleading stage.

Claim 18, alleging disability harassment under FEHA, was dismissed against the City with leave to amend. The court found that the alleged conduct either involved personnel-management decisions, such as discussing medical separation or denying accommodations, or was too conclusory to support a harassment claim. The individual defendants were dismissed from this claim with prejudice.

Claim 20, alleging failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment, could proceed against the City because Horton had adequately pleaded an underlying disability-discrimination claim and had alleged harassment at least as part of his Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. The individual defendants were dismissed from this claim with prejudice.

Other Claims

Claim 13, alleging a violation of Horton’s due-process rights before medical separation under the state-law process known as a Skelly hearing, was dismissed against all defendants with leave to amend. Documents attached to the complaint indicated that Horton received notice of the proposed separation, the reasons and supporting materials, and an opportunity to respond. The court found his contrary allegations too conclusory but allowed amendment.

Claim 23, under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, was dismissed with prejudice against all defendants. The court held that the Act focuses on private business establishments and that Horton did not show how it applied to the defendants. Claim 24, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, was also dismissed with prejudice against all defendants because that statute does not provide a private right to sue.

Claims 27–29, alleging negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, were dismissed with leave to amend. Horton did not identify clearly which defendants were sued on these claims or what specific actions supported each claim.

Disposition and Case Status

The order’s title states that the motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part, and the conclusion states that they were granted in part and dismissed in part in the manner described above. The court referred Horton to the Federal Pro Bono Project for possible appointment of counsel and stayed all proceedings until four weeks after an attorney was appointed. Any amended complaint would be due 30 days after counsel’s appointment. Judge Orrick signed the order on March 16, 2023.